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HAS FEDERAL INDIAN LAW FINALLY ARRIVED
AT “THE FAR END OF THE TRAIL OF TEARS”?†
Ann E. Tweedy
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the United States Supreme Court’s July 9, 2020
decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which held that the historic boundaries of
the Creek reservation remain intact, and argues that the decision may signal
a sea change in the course of federal Indian law of the magnitude of
Obergefell v. Hodges in the LGBT rights arena. The Article shows how the
opinion lays a very strong foundation for a much-needed return to traditional
federal Indian law principles, respectful treatment of tribal governments as
a third sovereign in the American system, and an understanding of fairness
from the perspective of tribes and Native individuals. The possible effects of
Justice Barrett’s replacement of Justice Ginsburg on the Court’s future
federal Indian law jurisprudence are also explored. The Article concludes
with the hope that Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion will foster
predictability in the wildly unstable area of diminishment and
disestablishment jurisprudence, as well as in other facets of federal Indian
law.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court issued its opinion in McGirt v. Oklahoma on
July 9, 2020,1 ruling in a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Gorsuch that
the three million-acre Creek reservation in Eastern Oklahoma had not
been disestablished and thus that its historical boundaries remained
intact.2 Although the case itself resulted from an application for
post-conviction relief brought by an individual who had been
convicted of child sexual abuse, the reason that it was so closely
watched was because Mr. McGirt’s argument about Oklahoma’s lack
of jurisdiction over him depended on the continuing reservation status
of the Creek Nation’s historical reservation.3
The Indian law bar had nervously anticipated the long-awaited
decision.4 In a highly unusual turn of events, a predecessor case, Sharp
v. Murphy, from which Justice Gorsuch recused himself, was argued
in November 2018.5 After additional briefing was ordered, the case
was held over for reargument in the following term.6 The order for
additional briefing and the subsequent holding over of the case spurred
speculation that the Justices were split 4–4 in Sharp.7 The Court
1. 140 S. Ct. at 2452.
2. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 153–54 (7th ed. 2020).
When Congress has disestablished a reservation, it is no longer legally considered a reservation, and the
special jurisdictional rules that apply on reservations no longer obtain. Id. Similarly, when Congress has
diminished a reservation, the boundaries have been shrunk; in other words, the reservation status of part
of the lands has been extinguished. Id.
3. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2459–60 (noting that the Creek Nation appeared as amicus curiae “because
Mr. McGirt’s personal interests [wound] up implicating the Tribe’s”); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
The Creek Reservation Cases and the Great Conflict of Modern Day Federal Indian Law, A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/tyl/topics/professionaldevelopment/the-creek-reservation-cases-and-great-conflict-modern-day-federal-indian-law/
[https://perma.cc/N3TP-43LG].
4. See, e.g., Acee Agoyo, Still No Sign of Supreme Court Arguments in Closely-Watched Indian
Country Case, INDIANZ.COM (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.indianz.com/News/2019/11/11/still-no-signof-supreme-court-arguments.asp [https://perma.cc/VVR2-Y4RV].
5. 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (per curiam); see also Agoyo, supra note 4.
6. Christopher Coble, Carpenter v. Murphy: The Case the Justices Couldn’t Decide, FINDLAW: U.S.
SUP.
CT.
NEWS
BLOG
(July
9,
2019,
3:04
PM),
https://blogs.findlaw.com/supreme_court/2019/07/carpenter-v-murphy-the-case-the-justices-couldntdecide.html [https://perma.cc/D25T-P6LD]. The case was finally decided after McGirt. See generally
Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412.
7. See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Textualism’s Gaze, 25 MICH. J. RACE & L. 111, 113 (2020);
Coble, supra note 6.
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originally scheduled the argument in McGirt (whose issues mirrored
those in Sharp) for April 2020 but then postponed it until May because
of the coronavirus pandemic. 8 Additionally, the Justices’ questions and
comments during the oral arguments in both cases did not provide a
clear indication of which way the Court was leaning, although some
saw the argument questions in Sharp as being more favorable to
Oklahoma.9
Would the Supreme Court’s doctrine in the area of diminishment
and disestablishment become more incoherent because of a new
results-oriented decision, or would the Court hew to the bright line it
had recently re-inscribed in Nebraska v. Parker,10 despite the fact that
that the historic Creek Reservation was much more populous—and
thus home to many more non-Indians in terms of hard numbers—than
the historic Omaha Reservation whose boundaries were held to be
intact in Parker? Until well into July 2020, past June 30th (the date at
which the Court normally issues its last decisions for the term and then
breaks for recess),11 it was anyone’s guess.
In the popular understanding, the McGirt opinion is viewed as
remarkable for its practical effect—over three million acres in
Oklahoma are now understood to be an Indian reservation, despite the
fact that many people assumed the reservation to be defunct and
merely a relic of history.12 But, from the viewpoint of a federal Indian
8. See
Press
Release,
Sup.
Ct.
of
the
U.S.
(Apr.
13,
2020),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/pressreleases/pr_04-13-20
[https://perma.cc/Y4LQE8KV].
9. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107); Ronald Mann,
Argument Analysis: For the Second Time in Two Terms, Justices Consider Reservation Status of Eastern
Oklahoma, SCOTUS BLOG (May 12, 2020, 4:24 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/05/argumentanalysis-for-the-second-time-in-two-terms-justices-consider-reservation-status-of-eastern-oklahoma/
[https://perma.cc/PSR3-2RC7]; Ronald Mann, Argument Analysis: Justices Dubious About Ramifications
of Broad Indian Reservation in Oklahoma, SCOTUS BLOG (Nov. 27, 2018, 6:24 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/argument-analysis-justices-dubious-about-ramifications-of-broadindian-reservation-in-oklahoma/ [https://perma.cc/W6UT-C4ET].
10. 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).
11. See, e.g., FAQs: Announcements of Orders and Opinions, SCOTUS BLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/faqs-announcements-of-orders-and-opinions/
[https://perma.cc/SL67LGTT].
12. See, e.g., Richard Wolf & Kevin Johnson, Supreme Court Says Eastern Oklahoma Remains Native
American Territory, USA TODAY: POLITICS, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/07/09/
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law scholar, the opinion is remarkable for its straightforwardness and
dearth of post hoc rationales. 13 In other words, the McGirt decision is
unusual in contemporary federal Indian law because it is a Supreme
Court decision that hews closely to both traditional federal Indian law
principles and general statutory interpretation principles, eschewing
the approach that many Supreme Court cases have taken from the
Rehnquist Court onwards of trying to shut down the exercise of tribal
sovereignty wherever possible, no matter how flimsy or novel the
proffered justification for doing so.14 The McGirt decision is also
noteworthy for its respectful tone vis-à-vis tribes and tribal
sovereignty.
Although the recent addition of Justice Barrett to the Court
following Justice Ginsburg’s death creates a great deal of uncertainty,
the opinion may signal a return to the relatively predictable and
well-reasoned federal Indian law jurisprudence that we more
commonly saw in Supreme Court cases from the late 1950s to the
mid-1970s, as well as in some cases decided in the 1980s.15 In terms
supreme-court-allows-native-american-jurisdiction-half-oklahoma/3208778001/
[https://perma.cc/7BHR-QRVT] (July 9, 2020, 1:57 PM); see also Robert J. Miller & Torey Dolan, The
Indian Law Bombshell: McGirt v. Oklahoma, 101 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 31)
(on file with the Georgia State University Law Review) (“Oklahoma and Oklahomans had assumed and
operated for over 100 years as if there was no Creek Reservation.”).
13. Accord Dean B. Suagee, The Supreme Court’s “Whack-a-Mole” Game Theory in Federal Indian
Law, a Theory That Has No Place in the Realm of Environmental Law, 7 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RES. J. 90,
96–97 (2002); see also Joy Harjo, After a Trail of Tears, Justice for ‘Indian Country,’ N.Y. TIMES (July
14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/opinion/mcgirt-oklahoma-muscogee-creek-nation.html
[https://perma.cc/2KNB-JU4N].
14. See, e.g., Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, the Marshall Trilogy,
and United States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next Legislative Restoration of Tribal
Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 651, 677–83 (2009) [hereinafter Tweedy, Connecting the Dots];
Ann E. Tweedy, Indian Tribes and Gun Regulation: Should Tribes Exercise Their Sovereign Rights to
Enact Gun Bans or Stand-Your-Ground Laws?, 78 ALB. L. REV. 885, 897 (2015) [hereinafter Tweedy,
Indian Tribes]; Leah Jurss, Halting the “Slide down the Sovereignty Slope”: Creative Remedies for Tribes
Extending Civil Infraction Systems over Non-Indians, 16 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 39, 49–54 (2015).
Although the Supreme Court has had a decidedly mixed record in its dealings with tribes over time (with
its level of openness to tribal rights having been subject to vast shifts that often correlate with the
congressional policy of the day), the period beginning during Chief Justice Rehnquist’s tenure and
continuing in some measure into the present has been characterized by hostility to tribal rights that
contravenes—and even may constitute an attempt to undo—congressional policy. See, e.g., ROBERT T.
ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES & COMMENTARY 77–78, 153–54 (4th ed. 2020).
15. See generally Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz.,
411 U.S. 164 (1973); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); New Mexico v.
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of tone, the decision is unusual in that it takes into account fairness
concerns from the Creek Nation’s perspective,16 and it enforces as a
solemn obligation Congress’s historical promises to the Nation. Thus,
rather than playing the all-too-common role of “court as the
conqueror,”17 the Court’s decision attempts to do justice by applying
the relevant legal principles in a straightforward manner, properly
recognizing that Congress—and not the Court—has plenary power in
the area of Indian affairs.18 In taking this approach, the Court overtly
rejects the oft-recited notion that widespread past injustices inflicted
on a tribe and then relied upon by non-Natives make it impossible to
rule in favor of a tribe in a contemporary case.19 The McGirt majority
instead proclaims, forthrightly and powerfully, that “[u]nlawful acts,
performed long enough and with sufficient vigor, are never enough to
amend the law.”20
In the context of the Supreme Court’s federal Indian law
jurisprudence, which had become so unstable and so frequently hostile
to tribal rights in recent years that attorneys who represent tribes very

Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983); Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30
(1989); Bethany R. Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes in the U.S. Supreme Court?: Menominee, Nebraska
v. Parker, Bryant, Dollar General . . . and Beyond, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1901, 1901 (2017) (describing
Court decisions in federal Indian law authored by the previous generation of progressive Justices).
16. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 683 (noting that the Court often “appears
unwilling to give tribal interests genuine weight or to make the effort necessary to grasp the genuine
import of tribal interests”); Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Sovereignty over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 26 (1999) (noting the
one-sidedness of the Court’s perception of fairness in diminishment and disestablishment cases generally);
accord Fletcher, supra note 7, at 114 (“Justice Gorsuch appears to be the rare judge who takes seriously
the views of Indian tribes in interpreting Indian law.”).
17. Frickey, supra note 16, at 73.
18. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978) (“[A] proper respect both for
tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress in this area cautions that we tread lightly
in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent.” (first citing Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194,
199–200 (1975); and then citing Choate v. Trapp, 244 U.S. 665, 675 (1912))).
19. Accord Bethany R. Berger, McGirt v. Oklahoma and the Past, Present, and Future of Reservation
Boundaries, 169 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 29–32),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3694051 (describing the frequency with which
states violated federal law by asserting authority over reservations during and after the allotment period
and noting that “McGirt finally ended the practice of relying on historical exercises of state jurisdiction
as evidence of reservation diminishment”); see also Ann E. Tweedy, Unjustifiable Expectations: Laying
to Rest the Ghosts of Allotment-Era Settlers, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 129, 155 & n.134 (2012).
20. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2482 (2020).
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often would “try to avoid the Supreme Court at all costs,”21 the
decision, including both its tone and substance, feels like a sea change
equal to the magnitude of Obergefell v. Hodges and the historic sex
discrimination case Reed v. Reed.22 By way of background, the
Obergefell Court’s decision in 2015 that the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment protect an individual’s
right to enter into a same-sex marriage (as well as a different-sex one)
emphatically affirmed that LGBT individuals were deserving of the
same legal benefits and protections as others and thereby broke with
over a century of precedent disparaging LGBT persons, criminalizing
their sexual conduct, and denying them the rights that others enjoyed. 23
And the Supreme Court’s dramatic disavowal in its 1971 decision in
Reed of the patriarchal notion that the law could, consistent with the
Equal Protection Clause, automatically prefer men over women for
important roles like the administration of estates destabilized centuries
of enshrinement of male privilege in the American legal tradition,
including the vestiges of the long-held conception of women as
property, and caused our entire legal framework to shift a bit toward
equality of the sexes.24
Similarly, the McGirt decision is a powerful affirmation of rights
too often ignored and disparaged in the Supreme Court and elsewhere
in our culture.25 On one level, it is about upholding and enforcing a
treaty promise.26 But, by recognizing that the promises the government
made in exchange for its heart-wrenching demands were meaningful,
the Court also implicitly acknowledges that the Creek Nation’s
sacrifices—including their brutal, forced relocation to present-day
Oklahoma, an area far from their traditional territory in the
21. See, e.g., Alex Tallchief Skibine, Teaching Indian Law in an Anti-Tribal Era, 82 N.D. L. REV.
777, 777 (2006).
22. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015) (recognizing the constitutional right to
same-sex marriage under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 71 (1971) (holding that state laws may not use a party’s gender as a basis to
discriminate among candidates for administration of a decedent’s estate).
23. See generally Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1551 (1993).
24. Reed, 404 U.S. at 71.
25. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2452.
26. Id. at 2459.
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southeastern United States—were meaningful as well.27 Thus, as poet
laureate Joy Harjo commented, the McGirt decision is actually “about
so much more” than the enforcement of a single treaty promise. 28 “It
[is] about validity, personhood, humanity—the assertion of our human
rights as Indigenous peoples and our right to exist.”29 In other words,
the decision represents an all too rare instance when a tribe was heard
in the Supreme Court and was treated with dignity and respect rather
than being disparaged or recoiled from in fear. 30
I. THE CONFOUNDING JURISPRUDENCE OF RESERVATION
DIMINISHMENT AND DISESTABLISHMENT AS A CONTRAST TO THE
MAJORITY’S SOUND AND INTERNALLY CONSISTENT REASONING IN
MCGIRT
A. The Confounding Jurisprudence of Reservation Diminishment
and Disestablishment
The Supreme Court’s diminishment and disestablishment
jurisprudence has been inconsistent at best, with one highly respected
scholar suggesting that the Court’s “judicial method” in these cases
27. Id.
28. Harjo, supra note 13.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 7, at 133 (“Throughout the Indian law canon, Indian people are
referred to as ‘incompetents,’ ‘wards,’ unlettered, people without laws, uncivilized heathens, and so on.
Regardless of the language used, the Court’s Indian affairs jurisprudence depends on the presumed
inferiority of Indian people.” (first quoting Drummond v. United States, 324 U.S. 316, 318 (1945); then
quoting Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 724 (1983); then citing United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371,
380–81 (1908); and then citing Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60, 62 (1906))). The December 2015 oral
argument in Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (per
curiam), represents an example of the Court recoiling in fear from the prospect of tribal jurisdiction over
a non-member business. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 15, at 1937–38 (describing the oral argument and
noting that the argument devolved into “a blood bath” when the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians’
attorney stepped up to the podium). Although the “blood bath” scene that Berger describes seems to be
more rooted in anger than fear, anger is actually predicated on other emotions that are connected to
vulnerability—one of the most common of which is fear. See, e.g., Paul Thagard, How Fear Leads to
Anger: Emotions Cause Other Emotions, As When People’s Fears Cause Them to Be Angry., P SYCH.
TODAY: HOT THOUGHT (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/hotthought/201811/how-fear-leads-anger [https://perma.cc/DA3S-T2G8]; Leon F. Seltzer, What Your Anger
May Be Hiding: Reflections on the Most Seductive—and Addictive—of Human Emotions., PSYCH. TODAY:
EVOLUTION OF THE SELF (July 11, 2008), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/evolution-theself/200807/what-your-anger-may-be-hiding [https://perma.cc/N6XR-KTH9].
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has the appearance of being “essentially lawless.”31 This inconsistency
may be due, in part, to the view of some Justices, at least historically,
that adhering to precedent was less critical—or even optional—in the
field of federal Indian law. For example, the late Justice Scalia once
wrote approvingly in an internal memorandum:
[O]ur opinions in th[e] field [of Indian law] have not posited
an original state of affairs that can subsequently be altered
only by explicit legislation, but have rather sought to discern
what the current state of affairs ought to be by taking into
account all legislation, and the congressional “expectations”
that it reflects, down to the present day. 32
For Justice Scalia, this realization served as the basis to depart from
his planned course of joining Justices Brennan and Marshall in their
dissent in Duro v. Reina,33 in which they argued that the Court should
have supported the Salt River Pima Maricopa Tribe’s interest in
maintaining law and order on its reservation; Justice Scalia’s
realization therefore justified his decision to instead join the majority
opinion in that case and also appeared to influence his decisions in
subsequent federal Indian law cases.34 Justice Scalia later casually
acknowledged his free-wheeling approach to federal Indian law at a
book signing, where he told a young Native woman who mentioned
that her family had had a federal Indian law case go up to the Supreme
Court when she was in elementary school: “You know, when it comes
to Indian law, most of the time we’re just making it up.”35
31. Frickey, supra note 16, at 24; see also Fletcher, supra note 7, at 121 (“[T]he outcomes of
reservation boundaries disputes are unpredictable if not completely random.”); Fletcher, supra note 3;
Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 30 (1995) (describing the Court’s
then-current approach to diminishment and disestablishment cases as “essentially ad hoc”).
32. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 698 n.238 (citing Frickey, supra note 16, at 63).
33. 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
34. See Frickey, supra note 16, at 62–63; see also Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 686
n.168 (collecting sources that connect the Court’s decisions in Duro and other cases that divested tribes
of jurisdiction to problems of lawlessness on reservations).
35. April Youpee-Roll: Supreme Court Makes Up Indian Law Decisions, INDIANZ.COM (Feb. 18,
2016),
https://www.indianz.com/News/2016/02/18/april-youpeeroll-supreme-court.asp
[https://perma.cc/6PHJ-ERJF].
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Justice Scalia’s untethered approach to cases involving tribes
contrasted with his much more constrained originalist and textualist
approach in other areas of the law.36 And his Indian law approach was
all the more surprising because, outside of the context of federal Indian
law, he frequently chastised other Justices for applying what he
perceived as their own values to resolve cases rather than focusing
solely on the Framers’ intent as to constitutional issues or legislative
intent, as discerned from statutory language, in statutory cases.37
Thus, we have one prominent (and purportedly anti-activist) former
Justice openly espousing the view that precedent has less force in
federal Indian law and that he and other Justices were free to disregard
it whenever they believed doing so was warranted. Whether or not
other Supreme Court Justices would have (or currently do) explicitly
subscribe to this view, the body of diminishment and disestablishment
cases suggests that some do so and that some previous Justices have
done so, at least in practice.
To briefly summarize the background for the question at issue in
McGirt, diminishment and disestablishment cases examine whether a
reservation has been partially or fully extinguished because of a
congressional decision to sell off some reservation lands to
homesteaders during a period of history when the government’s policy
was to forcibly assimilate tribal citizens into mainstream American
culture by violating tribal rights and abolishing tribal communal
property ownership.38 Diminishment and disestablishment questions
normally turn on whether a statute allowing for the allotment of a

36. John F. Manning, Justice Scalia & the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 115 MICH. L. REV. 747, 747–50
(2017); cf. Craig S. Lerner, Justice Scalia’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence: The Failure of
Sake-of-Argument Originalism, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 96–97 (2019) (noting that Justice
Scalia’s approach to the Eighth Amendment was not purely originalist because he did at times defer to
non-originalist precedent). Even more strikingly, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008),
Justice Scalia embraced a non-originalist view of the Second Amendment (while maintaining that it was
rooted in originalism). Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism As Popular Constitutionalism in
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 238–40, 240 n.250 (2008).
37. See, e.g., Amy L. Padden, Overruling Decisions in the Supreme Court: The Role of a Decision’s
Vote, Age, and Subject Matter in the Application of Stare Decisis After Payne v. Tennessee, 82 GEO. L.J.
1689, 1705 n.134 (1994); Fletcher, supra note 7, at 117. See generally J. Lyn Entrikin, Disrespectful
Dissent: Justice Scalia’s Regrettable Legacy of Incivility, 18 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 201 (2017).
38. See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 19, at 130, 136.
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specific reservation and the sale of “surplus lands”39 to non-members
had the effect of eliminating the reservation status of the whole body
of reservation lands or of shrinking the reservation (usually in such a
way that the so-called surplus lands would no longer be considered
included within reservation boundaries).40 Reservation status, in turn,
generally means that, for criminal cases involving Native Americans
as victims or defendants, the federal government, and in some cases,
the tribe (rather than the state)41 will have jurisdiction. Reservation
status also affects civil jurisdiction to some extent, but the contours of
these effects are much less predictable. 42
For the past few decades, the Court has used the three-step analysis
laid out in Solem v. Bartlett to determine whether a given reservation
has been diminished or disestablished, 43 but it has not been consistent
about how and when the latter steps apply.44 Besides this
inconsistency, another problem with the Court’s jurisprudence in this
area is that it seems to impose a “magic language” requirement in the
first step,45 which addresses statutory language and congressional
intent, but it sometimes appears to expand the universe of qualifying
magic language in an outcome-determinative manner.46

39. The lands considered “surplus” were those lands not allotted to tribal members. See, e.g., id. at
134.
40. See, e.g., id. at 134, 143–44.
41. However, a few states have been explicitly granted criminal jurisdiction over reservations within
their borders under a federal law referred to as Public Law 280. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280,
67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1162, 1360, and 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26); see
also Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 694.
42. See, e.g., Tweedy, Indian Tribes, supra note 14, at 893–99.
43. 465 U.S. 463, 472, 476, 478 (1984).
44. See, e.g., Miller & Dolan, supra note 12, at 17 (explaining that the Supreme Court first laid out
the three-part test in Solem); Frickey, supra note 16, at 24, 26 (acknowledging that “[t]aken as a whole,
the judicial method in the diminishment cases might appear to be essentially lawless” and noting that “a
reading of these cases suggests . . . a casual, unreflective concession to non-Indian instincts”); Fletcher,
supra note 7, at 120–21 (noting that, after Solem, “nothing [besides the fact that the three-part test would
be applied in some fashion] was certain or predictable in how these cases would be decided”).
45. See Frickey, supra note 16, at 18. The term “magic language” refers to the fact that the Court
parses very similar statutory terms relating to tribal cession of the surplus lands differently in terms of
whether they are read to effect diminishment or disestablishment. See id. Thus, a layperson reading the
statutes that have been held to effect diminishment and those that have been held not to effect
diminishment might very well conclude that they all say basically the same thing. See id.
46. Id. at 24, 26.
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The three steps are: (1) the statutory language itself; (2) the
legislative history and the course of negotiations with the relevant tribe
or tribes (also sometimes referred to as “surrounding circumstances”);
and finally, (3) post-enactment history, including the demographics of
the contested area. 47 Theoretically, it is only when a statute is
ambiguous that a court should move on to analyzing the less probative
information adduced from steps two and three,48 but, in practice, the
Court has sometimes used the latter steps—especially the third—to
support holdings of diminishment that seemed to run contrary to the
statutory language.49 However, adhering closely to Congress’s intent
is extremely important in the federal Indian law context because
Congress is the branch of the federal government that has been held to
have plenary power over tribes and because one of the foundational
principles of Indian law is that tribes retain their sovereign powers
(except those like treaty-making power with foreign nations that would
be inconsistent with their position within the United States), unless
Congress has explicitly acted to remove the power at issue. 50 Thus,
diminishment and disestablishment, like the abrogation of other treaty
rights, should not be lightly inferred. Instead, to hold a treaty right to
be abrogated, a court needs to find “clear and plain” evidence that
Congress considered the conflict between its proposed action and the
treaty right and chose to resolve the conflict by abrogating the treaty
right.51 Thus, when the Court relies on steps two and three in the
absence of at least ambiguous statutory language suggesting intent to
abrogate tribal rights in step one, it violates its own overarching Indian
law principles.
The earliest diminishment cases undertook a more holistic analysis
of the statutory language to determine whether it genuinely
47. 1 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.04[3] (2020) [hereinafter COHEN].
48. See id. (noting that a statutory ambiguity is required to move on to step two); Frickey, supra note
16, at 18 (discussing the Court’s decision in Solem, 465 U.S. 463); see also Royster, supra note 31, at 30–
31 (discussing early diminishment and disestablishment cases, in which the Court focused primarily on
the language of the surplus land acts themselves).
49. Frickey, supra note 16, at 18–26; see also Fletcher, supra note 3; Royster, supra note 31, at 34–
36 (discussing Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977)).
50. See, e.g., ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 71–72; Fletcher, supra note 7, at 123; see also Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978) (alluding to Congress’s plenary power in Indian Affairs).
51. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738–40 (1986); see also Berger, supra note 15, at 1921.
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demonstrated that Congress clearly intended to terminate reservation
status for all or part of the reservation lands.52 Starting in the
mid-1970s, however, the Court began to conclude that language
indicating an intent for a tribe to cede lands unconditionally to the
United States for a sum certain was sufficient to support a judicial
inference of an intent to diminish or disestablish a reservation.53 The
Court later expanded this universe of so-called magic language to
include run-of-the-mill language that “restor[ed] land to the public
domain.”54 As I have argued elsewhere, the Court’s contemporary
enforcement of statutes—based on the intent of the Congress that
passed the statute so as to implement a repudiated and “disastrous”
policy aimed at assimilating tribes, usually against their wills 55—is
artificial and unjust.56 Nonetheless, if this is the course that the Court
has determined to take, one would hope that at least it would be
undertaken in a consistent manner in order to imbue highly significant
questions of continued reservation status with some level of
predictability. Instead, however, the Court’s diminishment and
disestablishment jurisprudence has often seemed confoundingly
inconsistent.57
One recent case that seemed poised to reinscribe much-needed
clarity to diminishment and disestablishment jurisprudence was a
unanimous 2016 opinion called Nebraska v. Parker.58 Although
diminishment and disestablishment cases are invariably contentious,
this case was arguably relatively uncontroversial because it involved
the validity of a tribal law requiring a tribal liquor license to engage in
on-reservation liquor sales, and such tribal laws are explicitly

52. See, e.g., Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504 (1973); Royster, supra note 31, at 30–31.
53. DeCoteau v. Dist. Cnty. Ct. for Tenth Jud. Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 445 (1975); Frickey, supra note
16, at 18–19.
54. Frickey, supra note 16, at 18–19, 21 (discussing earlier cases in conjunction with Hagen v. Utah,
510 U.S. 399 (1994)); see also Royster, supra note 31, at 30–31 (discussing early diminishment cases).
55. Frickey, supra note 16, at 15, 25.
56. See, e.g., Ann E. Tweedy, The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court’s Divestment &
Debasement of Tribal Sovereignty, 18 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 147, 193–94 (2000).
57. Frickey, supra note 16, at 24; see also Fletcher, supra note 3; Fletcher, supra note 7, at 121.
58. 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1076 (2016); see also Fletcher, supra note 7, at 121 (noting that Parker “seemed
to put an end to much of [the] nonsense” evident in prior reservation boundary cases).

Published by Reading Room, 2021

13

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 4

752

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:3

sanctioned under federal law.59 Additionally, the federal statute
sanctioning application of tribal law had been upheld as a valid
delegation to Indian tribes over forty years before. 60 Perhaps in part
because of these relatively tame facts 61—and despite the fact that the
Supreme Court’s federal Indian law decisions are very often fractured
and that tribes generally lose,62 especially when state or non-member
interests are implicated 63—Parker was a unanimous decision in favor
of the Omaha Tribe. In a twelve-page-opinion, the Court determined,
primarily based on the text of the statute under which the disputed
parcel, now containing the Village of Pender and the establishments to
which the Omaha Tribe was attempting to apply its liquor licensing
requirements, that Congress had not diminished the reservation.64
The 1882 Act at issue in the case authorized the Secretary of the
Interior to survey and sell tracts of reservation land to non-members.65
It contained none of the magic language (or “hallmarks,” as Justice
Thomas’s majority opinion more charitably termed the required
words) indicating complete and total surrender of tribal interests; and
because the parcels were to be sold off on a piecemeal basis, the Act
did not provide for “sum certain” compensation to the Tribe by the
federal government.66 The second factor, relating to the legislative
history of the Act and the course of negotiations with the Tribe, was

59. Parker, 577 U.S. at 486 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1161).
60. See generally United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
61. Additionally, amicus briefs submitted to the Court detailing unfairness in the allotment process
with respect to these particular lands may have had some influence on the Court. See Berger, supra note
15, at 1923–24.
62. See Richard D. Pomp, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Indian Commerce Clause and State Taxation,
63 TAX LAW. 897, 996 n.380 (2010); Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial
Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1190 (2001).
63. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights,
Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 268, 281 (2001); see also Berger,
supra note 15, at 1906–07; Fletcher, supra note 7, at 130, 135 (noting that “tribal assertions of power over
non-members attract the Court’s attention” and that, for Indians and tribes, “the numerous biases of the
judiciary make every case a presumptive loser”). The Supreme Court’s June 2021 decision in United
States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021), like the decisions in McGirt and Parker, is an important deviation
from this bleak principle and supports the idea that McGirt may well signal a sea change. At the very least,
we now know that McGirt was not simply an aberration.
64. Parker, 577 U.S. at 481, 489–90.
65. Act of Aug. 7, 1882, ch. 434, 22 Stat. 341.
66. Parker, 577 U.S. at 489.
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mixed.67 Though the third factor, relating to the United States’
subsequent treatment of the land and its demographic make-up,
favored diminishment, the Court noted that it “ha[d] never relied solely
on th[e] third consideration to find diminishment.”68
The Village of Pender had, at the time of the case, approximately
1,300 residents,69 and the purportedly diminished area of the
reservation that includes Pender was over 99% non-Native in the year
2000.70 Thus, Parker presented a demographic setting similar to those
that had seemingly swayed the Court in previous cases to hold a
reservation diminished despite weak showings of congressional intent
in step one of the test.71 But the Court in Parker resisted the temptation
to determine the case based on the presumed expectations of the
non-Indians living in the area and instead proclaimed that “it is not our
role to ‘rewrite’ the 1882 Act in light of this subsequent demographic
history.”72
Parker, then, seemed to lay a foundation for a similar affirmance of
reservation status in Sharp and later in McGirt.73 At the same time,
there was considerable apprehension in the federal Indian law
community that the exponentially larger non-Indian population on the
Creek Reservation, including most of the roughly 400,000 people who
live in Tulsa alone, could be viewed to foreclose, as a practical matter,
a decision that favored the Creek Nation (which appeared as amicus
curiae in both Sharp and McGirt).74 Many tribal advocates had all but
67. Id. at 490–92.
68. Id. at 492.
69. Smith v. Parker, 996 F. Supp. 2d 815, 819 (D. Neb. 2014), aff’d, 774 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir), aff’d
sub nom. Nebraska v. Parker, 577 U.S. 481 (2016).
70. Brief for Petitioners at 28, Parker, 577 U.S. 481 (No. 14-406).
71. Frickey, supra note 16, at 18–26; see also Fletcher, supra note 3.
72. Parker, 577 U.S. at 493–94.
73. Sharp v. Murphy, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2412 (2020) (per curiam); McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct.
2452, 2464, 2469 (2020).
74. See Wendy Weitzel, Ruling Shifts Ground for Tribes, State, SEQUOYAH CNTY. TIMES,
https://www.sequoyahcountytimes.com/news/ruling-shifts-ground-tribes-state [https://perma.cc/Q6NRRE9B] (discussing views of tribal advocates); Fletcher, supra note 3; see also Supreme Court Schedules
Tribal Lands Case for Reargument Next Term, A.B.A.: DEATH PENALTY REPRESENTATION PROJECT (July
1, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/death_penalty_representation/project_press/2
019/summer [https://perma.cc/PRY4-96ME]; Agoyo, supra note 4. Many news articles treat the McGirt
decision as if it actually held that the entire eastern half of Oklahoma is Indian Country. See, e.g., Wolf &
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lost faith in the Court because of the apparent lawlessness of its prior
diminishment and disestablishment cases and, more broadly, because
of the Court’s extreme discomfort with the prospect of tribal
jurisdiction over non-members in the large majority of civil
jurisdiction cases that had come before it in recent decades.75 Thus,
despite the strength of the language in Parker and the clarity of its
analysis, there was trepidation that the Court would retreat from it
rather than face the prospect of potentially upsetting hundreds of
thousands of non-Natives to preserve a tribal right.76
B. The Majority’s Reasoning in McGirt
The unusual measures that the Court took in Sharp, such as ordering
further briefing on whether any federal statute granted Oklahoma
criminal jurisdiction over the historic Creek Reservation and on the
strawman question of whether there were circumstances under which
land might qualify as a reservation but still not qualify as Indian
country under 25 U.S.C. § 1151(a)77 and its holding the case over for
reargument the following term,78 support the inference that the
question of the continued reservation status of the Creek Nation’s
Johnson, supra note 12. This is erroneous in a technical sense and is based on the assumption that if the
Creek Nation’s reservation is still intact, those of other nearby tribes must be as well. See, e.g., McGirt,
140 S. Ct. at 2478–79 (describing and responding to Oklahoma’s arguments in that vein). On the other
hand, the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Seminole, and Choctaw Tribes’ reservations were allotted under the same
statutes as that of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, so these other four tribes undoubtedly have a strong
argument that their reservations similarly remain intact. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 19 (manuscript at 2).
Indeed, Oklahoma courts have held that other reservations allotted under the same statutes do in fact
remain intact. See generally Bosse v. Oklahoma, 484 P.3d 286 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021); Hogner v. State,
No. F-2018-138, 2021 WL 958412 (Okla. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2021).
75. See Weitzel, supra note 74; see also Fletcher, supra note 7, at 130, 135 (noting that “tribal
assertions of power over nonmembers attract the Court’s attention” and that for Indians and tribes, “the
numerous biases of the judiciary make every case a presumptive loser”).
76. The Court frequently seems to assume that non-Indians will be hostile to tribal jurisdiction,
although that may not be the case in many circumstances and certainly would not be true for all
non-Indians. See Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 705–06, 706 n.270.
77. Order
Requesting
Additional
Briefing,
140
S.
Ct.
2412
(2020),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/17-1107.html
[https://perma.cc/6SB3-ECCN]. The answer to this question is a simple “no,” unless one wanders far
afield from the facts of McGirt and imagines something like a state-recognized tribe that receives a
reservation from the state.
78. Order Restoring Case to Calendar for Reargument, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/17-1107.html
[https://perma.cc/6SB3-ECCN].
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Oklahoma land set aside was indeed more difficult for the Court than
that of the continued viability of the western section of the Omaha
Tribe’s reservation in Parker.79 The difficulty of the decision for the
Court is also evident from the fact that the decision in McGirt that
finally answered the question was a 5–4 decision, in sharp contrast to
the unanimous decision we saw in Parker.80 Indeed, even the author
of Parker, Justice Thomas, was willing to abandon the precedent the
case had set a mere four years later in McGirt.
Although the McGirt Court followed the trail blazed by Parker, the
decision is remarkable in its own right for a number of reasons.
Moreover, in the sometimes upside-down world of federal Indian law,
adherence to precedent is often remarkable in itself.81 This is
particularly so in cases in the area of diminishment and
disestablishment,82 as well as in the related area of tribal jurisdiction,
which are difficult from the Court’s perspective because of the
potential to both upset non-Indians’ presumed expectations and to
interfere with state interests.
1. The Canons of Construction in Federal Indian Law and the
Fact that Congress, Rather than the Supreme Court, Is the
Repository of Plenary Power
The Court’s majority opinion in McGirt is noteworthy in its respect
for Congress’s plenary power; instead of taking it upon itself to
complete what it often perceives as Congress’s unfinished project of
assimilation, the McGirt Court focuses squarely on the legislative
intent discernible from the statute under which the Creek reservation
was allotted.83 There are many examples where the Court, in recent
decades, has taken it upon itself to enforce the repudiated allotment
policy by denying a tribe jurisdiction over non-members or holding a
reservation to have been diminished or disestablished in the absence
79. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 3.
80. Compare McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2458 (2020), with Nebraska v. Parker, 577 U.S.
481, 494 (2016).
81. Berger, supra note 15, at 1905.
82. Royster, supra note 31, at 30, 37.
83. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2462–82.
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of clear congressional intent; and, in so holding, it sometimes invokes
the idea that the challenged exercise of tribal sovereignty is
inconsistent with the tribe’s dependent status.84 This approach is
contrary to the long-established doctrine that Congress (not the Court)
has plenary power over tribes,85 and it violates one of the core
principles or canons of construction in federal Indian law—namely
that “tribal rights and property rights are preserved unless Congress’[s]
intent to the contrary is clear and unambiguous.”86
The majority opinion in McGirt is a welcome departure from this
approach. Instead of trying to extrapolate from and implement
Congress’s long-repudiated policy in the present day, apparently to
save non-members the possible inconvenience and confusion that
could result from future exercises of tribal jurisdiction, the Court
carefully parses the statutory language and emphasizes that Congress
has the power to change the result should it desire to do so. Early in
the opinion, the Court notes that, because of the legislature’s
“significant constitutional authority when it comes to tribal relations,”
Acts of Congress are the “only . . . place” the Court may look to
determine if a reservation has been disestablished. 87 It further explains
that “courts have no proper role in the adjustment of reservation
borders.”88 At another point, the majority states: “If Congress wishes
to break the promise of a reservation, it must say so.”89 Later in the
Court’s analysis, it elucidates the necessity of relying on the words of
the statute and suggests that the fact that the laws being interpreted
relate to tribes is not a license to ignore congressional intent based on
84. See, e.g., Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 674–84 (discussing jurisdiction cases);
Tweedy, supra note 56, at 189–94 (discussing reliance on the allotment policy in the Court’s jurisdiction
cases); Frickey, supra note 16, at 21–26 (discussing diminishment cases); Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
Muskrat Textualism, 115 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 12),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3767096 (describing how the Supreme Court
sometimes intervenes without any authorization from Congress to “enforce the passivity of tribal
governments”).
85. See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 56, at 150; Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy
Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 163, 205, 213–14 (2002); see also Berger, supra note 19
(manuscript at 16).
86. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 72.
87. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2462.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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concerns about the possible reactions of non-tribal citizens to a ruling
in favor of a tribe.90 Thus, as the Court explains, consultation of
“contemporaneous usages, customs, and practices” may sometimes be
appropriate if they shed light on statutory meaning, but only if the
statutory terms themselves are ambiguous. 91
It similarly emphasizes that, as the “least compelling” category of
evidence relating to diminishment or disestablishment, evidence as to
subsequent demographics may only be used to elucidate ambiguous
statutory text.92 Thus, “extratextual sources” may never “overcome” a
statute’s clear terms.93 It then buttresses this statement by explaining
that to allow extratextual sources to overcome a statute’s plain
meaning would be “to allow States and courts to finish work Congress
has left undone, usurp the legislative function in the process, and treat
Native American claims of statutory right as less valuable than
others.”94 The reference to usurping legislative function is a clear
invocation of the importance of the judiciary’s deference to Congress’s
plenary power.95 By setting out this straightforward framework for
analysis of diminishment and disestablishment questions and by
buttressing it with a principled exegesis that ties federal Indian law

90. Id. at 2468–69.
91. Id. at 2468.
92. Id. at 2469 (quoting South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 356 (1998)).
93. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2469.
94. Id. at 2470 (emphasis added).
95. Although the Court has not been entirely consistent about the locus or loci of plenary power in the
U.S. Constitution, plenary power has often been tied to the Indian Commerce Clause and perhaps to a
somewhat lesser degree to the Treaty Clause. See, e.g., CANBY, supra note 2, at 102. Because power over
Indian affairs has been held to be the province of Congress, a usurpation occurs when the Court arrogates
that power to itself, and such a usurpation is properly understood as a violation of the separation of powers.
See, e.g., MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS:
LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 3.5 (2018) (explaining that “[t]he separation of powers doctrine, in
essence, acknowledges that in a multi-branch system of government there are limits on each branch’s
ability to encroach on the others”); MICHAEL P. ALLEN ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS: CONTEXT, CASES, AND
PROBLEMS 16 (3d ed. 2020) (noting that “on the federal level, separation-of-powers issues arise when the
act of any one of the three federal branches (legislative, executive, or judicial) affects one or more of the
remaining branches” and that “[t]he Framers remained faithful to ‘the political maxim that the legislative,
executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct’” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO.
47 (James Madison))); see also Tweedy, supra note 56, at 150; Tweedy, Indian Tribes, supra note 14, at
904.
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decisions to other areas of law,96 the McGirt opinion appears to be
attempting to lay a foundation for analysis in future decisions that will
make it more difficult for the Court to depart from unambiguous
statutory text to find diminishment or disestablishment based solely on
steps two and three of the doctrinal test.
The McGirt decision also reflects a nuanced view of the repudiated
allotment policy, which is relatively rare in Supreme Court decisions.97
As I have previously argued, to evaluate whether non-Indian settlers
developed expectations of reservation diminishment or
disestablishment as a result of the allotment policy and to determine
whether any such expectations were justifiable, it is crucial to
acknowledge that allotment, although borne out of an assimilationist
goal, was merely one step in the process.98 Settlers were often on
notice that the policy hit snags as it was being implemented and, in at
least some cases, should have known that the taking of tribal lands
constituted a violation of tribal property rights; so, courts should not
view allotment as having constituted an enforceable promise to
non-Indian settlers of either reservation disestablishment or freedom
from tribal jurisdiction.99 The majority in McGirt implicitly espouses
this line of thought when it says that “Congress may have passed
allotment laws to create the conditions for disestablishment. But to
equate allotment with disestablishment would confuse the first step of
the march with arrival at its destination.”100 This nuanced
understanding stands in sharp contrast with the blunt view of the
allotment policy as an indestructible assimilationist hammer that we

96. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2474 (“None of these moves would be permitted in any other area of statutory
interpretation, and there is no reason why they should be permitted here.”); see also Berger, supra note
15, at 1923 (describing the briefing in Parker on this question).
97. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2463.
98. Tweedy, supra note 19, at 171–72; see also Berger, supra note 19 (manuscript at 25) (noting that
“[t]he Dawes Act reflected a ‘policy of gradualism,’ under which Indians would be assimilated under
federal protection and control” (quoting FREDERICK E. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO
ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS, 1880–1920, at 52 (Bison Books 2001) (1984))).
99. See generally Tweedy, supra note 19.
100. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2465.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss3/4

20

Tweedy: Federal Indian Law

2021]

FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

759

see in the dissent in McGirt, as well as in many previous Supreme
Court cases.101
Similarly, the Court refuses to simply assume that non-Indian
allotment-era purchasers had justifiable expectations of reservation
disestablishment that trump any expectations that the Creeks might
have had as to the durability of the United States’ treaty promises.102
Instead, the Court almost appears to respond to my earlier critique of
the Court’s practice of simply presuming without any historical
analysis that non-Indian settlers had justifiable expectations as to the
diminishment or disestablishment of a reservation or as to the absence
of tribal jurisdiction.103
Thus, rather than assuming the existence of monolithic non-Indian
justifiable expectations, the McGirt majority acknowledges that “some
white settlers [may have] in good faith thought the Creek lands no
longer constituted a reservation. But maybe, too, some didn’t care and
others never paused to consider the question.”104 Later in the opinion,
the majority responds to Oklahoma’s allegation that its non-Native
citizens will be surprised to find that they live on a reservation with the
observation that “we imagine some members of the 1832 Creek Tribe
would be just as surprised to find them there.”105
These acknowledgements of a probable diversity of historical views
are startling in the context of the Court’s unimaginative body of case
law in this area, especially given that the Court takes the possible
expectations of Creek citizens into account as well, 106 but the majority
goes on to recognize some of the actual historical injustices to the
Creeks that were attendant on their land loss, in that some federal
officials in charge of implementing the law allotting the Creek
reservation held “shares or board positions in the very oil companies
who sought to deprive Indians of their lands.”107 The Court further
101.
44.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
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Tweedy, supra note 19, at 137.
Id. at 131.
McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2473.
Id. at 2479.
Accord Tweedy, supra note 19, at 137, 188; Fletcher, supra note 7, at 114.
McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2473.
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acknowledges that the Oklahoma courts appear to have been complicit
in this process in that they held “sham competency and guardianship
proceedings that divested Tribe members of oil rich allotments.”108
This historical analysis by the Court of the injustices to the Creeks that
were part and parcel of the allotment of their reservation feels like
nothing less than a reckoning. Where previously the Court has often
been unwilling or unable to seriously consider fairness questions from
a tribe’s perspective,109 the McGirt majority’s analysis is perceptive,
empirically rooted, and careful.
2. Adherence to Precedent
Another way that the majority opinion in McGirt fosters
predictability in diminishment and disestablishment cases is by
adhering to precedent.110 As explained above, the McGirt Court
followed and elaborated upon the Parker Court’s affirmation that the
proper focus in a diminishment or disestablishment inquiry is on
statutory language.111 If the Court had instead hastily retreated from
Parker in McGirt, as was widely feared, the Court’s jurisprudence in
the area would have been left in a completely incoherent state.
Thankfully, we instead have two congruent decisions four years apart
as the Court’s most recent pronouncements in this area, and there can
at least be a logically based hope that any subsequent decisions on
these matters in the reasonably near future will follow the same model.
In addition to the majority’s adherence to Parker, the Court also
relied on much older persuasive precedent, namely a 1905 decision
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirming that,
despite Congress’s plan to abolish the Creek’s government a mere one
year later, the Nation still had legislative and governmental powers
until such an abolition occurred, including the power to collect taxes

108. Id.
109. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 683; Frickey, supra note 16, at 26, 80; Fletcher,
supra note 7, at 114.
110. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 15, at 1905.
111. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2469.
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from non-Indians doing business within the reservation.112 As it turned
out, of course, Congress’s plans changed, and the abolition never
occurred. In following Parker and Buster v. Wright,113 rather than
deciding the case irrespective of past precedent, the Court in McGirt
seems to signal that the field of federal Indian law may be on the road
to some level of predictability. 114 If this is indeed the case, the benefits
will be vast; uncertainties as to how cases might ultimately be decided
in the Supreme Court have, in some cases, led to years of protracted
litigation with proceedings sometimes occurring simultaneously in
different fora.115 Additionally, this unpredictability has undoubtedly
chilled tribes from attempting to enforce their sovereign rights in
numerous instances.
3. The Respectful Tone of the Decision
McGirt is also fairly unusual among Supreme Court cases in the
respectful tone it uses with respect to tribal governments, placing them
on par with other sovereigns. Opinions that are on the less respectful
end of the continuum are sometimes subtle and sometimes more overt
in expressing a distrust of tribal sovereignty. For example, the opinion
in Parker somewhat subtly frames the question of diminishment as
whether the disputed land was “free[d] . . . of its reservation status.”116
Because the word “free” has a positive connotation, we are left with
the impression that not having the land be part of a reservation may be
112. Id. at 2466 (citing Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905)); see also Tweedy, supra note 19,
at 178–79 (discussing Buster, 135 F. 947).
113. Buster, 135 F. 947.
114. This hope is also supported to some degree by the Court’s more recent decision in United States
v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021). In Cooley, where the Court upheld a tribal officer’s authority to detain
and search a non-Native suspected of violating state or federal law, the Court adhered to its earlier
statement in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990), that a tribal officer lacking criminal jurisdiction
over a suspect could nonetheless detain the suspect and transport him or her to the state or federal
authorities that did have jurisdiction. Cooley, 114 S. Ct. at 1644. However, the Cooley Court’s unexplained
reliance on precedent relating to tribal civil jurisdiction in the context of a question pertaining to tribal
criminal jurisdiction is confusing and problematic. See infra notes 179–189 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Q&A with Snell & Wilmer’s Richard Derevan, LAW360.COM (Dec. 23, 2009),
https://www.law360.com (search in search bar for “Q&A with Snell & Wilmer’s Richard Derevan”)
(discussing Ford Motor Co. v. Todechenee, 488 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2007)).
116. Nebraska v. Parker, 577 U.S. 481, 483 (2016) (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 467
(1984)).
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the more positive outcome. Similarly, in Plains Commerce Bank v.
Long Family Land and Cattle Co.,117 a tribal jurisdiction case, the
Court casually frames the General Allotment Act itself as a positive
development and,118 later in the opinion, suggests that a bank’s
discrimination against a majority tribal member-owned business had
no discernible effect on the tribe or its members. 119 On the more overt
end, in the course of upholding tribal sovereign immunity from suit,
the majority in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing
Technologies, Inc. seemed to impugn the doctrine, 120 suggesting that,
despite the fact that sovereign immunity is considered an incident of
sovereignty for other governments (such as the federal government and
states), for tribes, it could only be justified if they were in a weak and
defenseless state. 121
The Supreme Court’s often disparaging view of tribes has deep
roots. In cases in 1823 and 1831 respectively, Chief Justice Marshall
describes the “Indians inhabiting this country [as] fierce savages,
whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly
from the forest” and, in the next opinion pertaining to tribes, describes
tribal citizens at the time that the Constitution was written as not
customarily resorting to courts; rather, Chief Justice Marshall tells us,
“[t]heir appeal was to the tomahawk, or to the government.”122
McGirt dramatically parts company with this approach of painting
tribes in a disparaging manner, whether explicitly or implicitly. 123
117. 554 U.S. 316, 316 (2008).
118. Id. at 328 (“Thanks to the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, 25
U.S.C. § 331 et seq., there are millions of acres of non-Indian fee land located within the contiguous
borders of Indian tribes.” (citing General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-105, 24 Stat.
388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–34, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381) (§§ 331–33 repealed 2000)).
119. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 683 & n.156 (discussing Plains Com. Bank, 554
U.S. 316); see also Plains Com. Bank, 554 U.S. at 332 (contrasting the discernible effect of non-member
activities that tribes have jurisdiction to regulate with the actions at issue in that case).
120. 523 U.S. 751, 751 (1998).
121. Id. at 756–58; see also Tweedy, Indian Tribes, supra note 14, at 893; Fletcher, supra note 84
(manuscript at 15).
122. Ann E. Tweedy, “Hostile Indian Tribes . . . Outlaws, Wolves, . . . Bears . . . Grizzlies and Things
Like That?” How the Second Amendment and Supreme Court Precedent Target Tribal Self-Defense, 13
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 687, 717–18 (2011) (first quoting Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); and then
quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)). For other examples of Supreme Court
cases relying on notions of tribal savagery, see id. at 719–22.
123. See, e.g., id. at 719–22; McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2467 (2020).
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Instead of highlighting the supposedly “anomalous” character of tribal
sovereignty,124 the majority seems to conceive of tribes as being
roughly on par with the state and federal governments. One prominent
example is the majority’s drawing of a parallel between the United
States’ selling its land to homesteaders and yet retaining sovereignty
over the area, on the one hand, and parcels within a reservation being
sold off and the tribe’s retention of sovereignty over the reservation
despite these land sales on the other.125 This understanding of tribal
sovereignty—as extending over lands within the boundaries of a
reservation no matter who owns the individual parcels—has been
codified in the Indian Country Statute, 126 as the majority
acknowledges;127 yet for decades, the Court has been retreating from
the territorial conception of tribal sovereignty codified in federal law
in favor of a consent-based conception of its own creation that is
primarily rooted in tribal membership. 128
Another indication of the majority opinion’s positive tone with
respect to the Creek Nation’s rights is the sanctity with which it views
the United States’ treaty promises. For example, the opinion
emphasizes the magnitude of what the Creeks gave up—namely, all of
their traditional lands in the East—when they accepted the Creek
reservation.129 It further emphasizes that they were promised that the
new reservation would be their “permanent home” and that the federal
government’s treaty promises to them were not “meant to be

124. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980). Writing for the
Court, Justice Marshall stated:
The status of the tribes has been described as “an anomalous one and of complex
character,” for . . . the tribes have retained “a semi-independent position . . . not as
States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a
separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations . . . .”
Id. (quoting McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973)).
125. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2464; see also Katherine Florey, Toward Tribal Regulatory Sovereignty in
the Wake of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 63 ARIZ. L. REV. 399, 432 (2021) (describing this portion of the
McGirt opinion as “near-revolutionary”).
126. 25 U.S.C. § 1151(a).
127. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2464.
128. See, e.g., Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 675; see also Fletcher, supra note 7, at
125 (describing the Court’s analysis in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)).
129. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2460–61.
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delusory.”130 This framing poignantly demonstrates the justice of
enforcing these treaty promises.
At another point, the majority rejects the State’s argument that the
federal government’s offer to the Creek Nation (which the Nation
accepted) to provide the Nation fee title to its lands (rather than
adhering to the federal government’s usual practice of holding the
lands in trust) actually defeated the reservation status of the lands.131
In rejecting this argument, the majority emphasizes the importance of
the federal government’s promise to the Nation and the moral
imperative that it keep its word: “[T]he State’s argument inescapably
boils down to the untenable suggestion that, when the federal
government agreed to offer more protection for tribal lands, it really
provided less. All this time, fee title was nothing more than another
trap for the wary.”132 This tone and framing represents another instance
of the majority’s approach of illustrating the justice of enforcing the
federal government’s promises to the Creek Nation by evoking the
Creek Nation’s point of view to elucidate the true stakes of continuing
to recognize the reservation.
4. Rejecting the Use of Past Legal Wrongs As Precedent
As I noted in previous work, there is a trope in federal Indian law
under which the Court understands widespread, on-the-ground
violations of a particular tribe’s land and sovereignty rights to create a
sort of legal precedent for continued violation of those rights.133 Under
this view, modern enforcement or recognition of the tribe’s previously
violated rights comes to be seen as practically impossible. Not only
does “such reasoning syllogistically and unfairly allow[] past injustice
to serve as a basis for present injustice, thus resulting in extreme and

130. Id. at 2460.
131. Id. at 2474.
132. Id. at 2474–76.
133. Tweedy, supra note 19, at 130, 155 & n.134, 170. Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in McGirt
provides a vivid illustration of the use of this trope. See Miller & Dolan, supra note 12, at 15–16 (citing
McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2484 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).
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ever increasing under-protection of tribal sovereign rights,”134 but it
also incentivizes non-Indian individuals and even state and local
governments to encroach upon tribal sovereignty by giving them the
message that they may do so with impunity and that their actions will
create a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. The majority in McGirt
roundly rejects this backwards system. In its most concise formulation,
the majority states that “the magnitude of a legal wrong is no reason to
perpetuate it.”135 Earlier in the opinion, the majority rejects this
approach by unpacking the absurdity of allowing a state’s violation of
a tribe’s rights to its reservation over time to amount to legal
evisceration of the reservation’s status:
Under our Constitution, States have no authority to reduce
federal reservations lying within their borders. Just imagine
if they did. A State could encroach on the tribal boundaries
or legal rights Congress provided, and, with enough time and
patience, nullify the promises made in the name of the
United States. That would be at odds with the Constitution,
which entrusts Congress with the authority to regulate
commerce with Native Americans, and directs that federal
treaties and statutes are the “supreme Law of the
Land.” . . . . It would also leave tribal rights in the hands of
the very neighbors who might be least inclined to respect
them.136
Given that this is exactly how the system has worked in some previous
diminishment and jurisdiction cases without being explicitly
acknowledged as such, this is a remarkable line in the sand that the
majority draws, refusing to continue to be an instrument of injustice.
A bit later in the opinion, it reaffirms the same principle—this time
with respect to past injustices inflicted by the federal government:
134. Tweedy, supra note 19, at 170; see also Berger, supra note 19 (manuscript at 9–10, 30–31)
(detailing the State of Oklahoma’s historical illegal assertions of jurisdiction over the Creek Nation’s
territory and outlining the State of Nebraska’s as well with respect to the Omaha Reservation).
135. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2480.
136. Id. at 2462 (citations omitted).
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“[I]t’s no matter how many other promises to a tribe the federal
government has already broken. If Congress wishes to break the
promise of a reservation, it must say so.”137 It is hard to resist the sense,
in reading the majority opinion in McGirt, that a new day is dawning
in federal Indian law. But it is a new day that is also an old day—one
that hearkens back to Felix Cohen’s classic formulations, the reign of
the rule of law, and the primacy of the canons of construction.
C. The Dissent in McGirt
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a strong dissent in McGirt, in which he
was joined by Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Thomas.138 Justice
Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the
decision below was unreviewable because it was supported by an
independent and adequate state law ground.139 The primary dissent’s
main focus in terms of legal analysis is on the fact that it sees the
majority as deviating from Solem’s three-part test; specifically, Chief
Justice Roberts accuses the majority of ignoring the latter two prongs
of the Solem test in favor of the first prong, which focuses on statutory
language.140 The dissent further complains that the majority views
“each of the statutes enacted by Congress in a vacuum,” divorced from
the “highly contextual inquiry” that the pre-Parker precedents
reflected (although the dissent neither acknowledges nor seems to
notice that Parker took the same approach as the majority).141
The primary dissent is also apparently convinced by the state’s
litany of dramatic fears recited in briefing and at oral argument, and,
accordingly, the dissent worries that “the State’s ability to prosecute
serious crimes will be hobbled and [that] decades of past convictions
could well be thrown out.”142 Additionally, the primary dissent is
convinced by the State’s argument that Congress’s partially executed
but later abandoned plan to dismantle the Creek government somehow
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2502 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2485–87 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2485–87.
Id. at 2482.
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operated to disestablish the reservation, although that is not an
approach that is reflected in other reservation boundaries cases. 143 A
concern for justifiable expectations of non-Indians living in the area is
also apparent in the primary dissent’s analysis, even though the
presence of these non-Indians is in many cases attributable to the
illegal activities of their ancestors or predecessors, as well as of federal
and state officials.144 In contrast to the majority opinion, the tone of
the primary dissent is cold and indifferent towards tribes, which is
unfortunately to be expected in Chief Justice Roberts’s opinions on
Indian law.145 Thus, we see bland statements in the primary dissent
describing horrific federal actions, such as: “In 1832, the Creek were
compelled to cede these lands to the United States in exchange for land
in present day Oklahoma.”146 Though seemingly innocuous on its face,
the statement is remarkable for its utter lack of recognition as to what
the Trail of Tears meant from the Creek’s perspective. It has the effect
of distorting the event into one that sounds neutral, thereby implicitly
justifying the idea that the promise of land in Oklahoma could be
broken with impunity. A few paragraphs later, the dissent glibly states
in reference to the promise of the Oklahoma reservation: “Forever, it
turns out, did not last very long.”147 The statement comes off as cold
and uncaring, and the most charitable interpretation of it is probably
that it was written by someone who, for whatever reason, completely
lacks the ability to imagine himself on the tribal side of the case.
Whatever the basis or origin of the statement, it is diametrically
opposed to the majority’s sensitive and thoughtful analysis, which also
takes a deeper and more nuanced view of the checkered history that
led to the current demographic situation. The dissent does respond to
the majority’s powerful observation that the dissent’s preferred

143. Id. at 2491.
144. Id. at 2502; Miller & Dolan, supra note 12, at 15–16.
145. See, e.g., Plains Com. Bank v. Long Fam. Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 328 (2008) (“Thanks
to the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, 25 U.S.C. § 331 et seq., there are
millions of acres of non-Indian fee land located within the contiguous borders of Indian tribes.” (citing
General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-105, 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–
34, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381) (§§ 331–33 repealed 2000)).
146. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2483 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
147. Id.
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approach of ignoring clear text in favor of surrounding circumstances
and subsequent history would not “be permitted in any other area of
statutory interpretation, and [that] there is no reason why [these moves]
should be permitted here,”148 with the unsatisfying statement that
“disestablishment cases call for a wider variety of tools than more
workaday questions of statutory interpretation.”149 In other words,
apparently, Indians’ property rights are not as deserving of the same
level of respect as others’ property rights.
In many ways, the primary dissent treads familiar and expected
ground. It reflects a one-sided preoccupation with non-Indians’
presumed understandings and entitlements and does not try to wrestle
with tribal interests, instead leaving them almost completely out of the
equation. The dissent also ignores the most recent precedent, Parker,
in favor of older precedent that allows for more flexibility and better
accommodates an outcome-determinative approach.150 The dissent
additionally reflects how polarized the Justices are on these issues, and
given that the decision in McGirt was 5–4, it stands for the
precariousness of the tribal victory, especially in light of Justice
Ginsburg’s recent passing.151
II. MCGIRT AND THE LARGER CONTEXT OF RECENT SUPREME COURT
CASES ON TRIBES AND TRIBAL RIGHTS
Although the tenor of Supreme Court cases in the last several
decades has generally been very negative for tribes, Parker and McGirt
are not the only recent cases to have positive outcomes. In addition to
Parker, the Supreme Court heard United States v. Bryant,152 another
case that was a clear win for the tribes, in its 2015 term; and to some
extent, the trend has continued in more recent cases.153 Before the two
148. Id. at 2474 (majority opinion).
149. Id. at 2500 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
150. See id. at 2486. See generally Nebraska v. Parker, 577 U.S. 481 (2016).
151. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2458.
152. 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016). See generally Berger, supra note 15.
153. See, e.g., Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1691 (2019) (finding a treaty “right to hunt on the
unoccupied lands of the United States”); Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss3/4

30

Tweedy: Federal Indian Law

2021]

FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

769

clear wins in the 2015 term, Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian
Community,154 a 2014 sovereign immunity case, stood as a the most
recent signal that tribes may not be inevitably doomed in the modern
Supreme Court.
McGirt, however, remains unique in its vision of tribes as bona fide
sovereigns that are a legitimate part of the framework of governance
in the United States and in the combination of its eminently respectful
tone and its subject matter. Tribal jurisdiction cases are notoriously
hard for tribes to win, and reservation boundary cases seem to be the
next hardest category, most likely in large part because of the potential
jurisdictional implications of intact reservation status.155 In McGirt in
particular, the Creek Nation seemed to have the cards stacked against
it not only because of demographics but also because the federal
government openly opposed its legal position that the reservation was
still in place, a circumstance that is often fatal to a tribal claim. 156
To briefly explore some of the other recent tribal wins, Bay Mills
was a tribal sovereign immunity case that was on all fours with
relatively recent precedent,157 albeit precedent in which the Court had
not enthusiastically endorsed the doctrine it applied (the
aforementioned Kiowa Tribe case).158 Bay Mills, a 5–4 decision,
1000, 1015–16 (2019) (plurality opinion) (finding a treaty right to travel that limits state taxing authority).
See generally United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021) (upholding a tribal officer’s ability to detain
and search a non-Native suspect, pending the arrival of state or federal officers). A fourth case, Upper
Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, that raised questions of tribal sovereign immunity in the context of an in
rem quiet title action, was a wash from the tribal interest perspective in that the Court remanded the case
for consideration of an argument raised by the non-Indian landowners for the first time in the Supreme
Court. 138 S. Ct. 1649, 1651 (2018). A fifth case that was closely watched nationwide resulted in a 4–4
split after Justice Kennedy recused himself, causing the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit recognizing a treaty habitat right to be upheld. Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832, 1833
(2018) (per curiam), aff’g by an equally divided court 864 F.3d 1017 (2017).
154. 572 U.S. 782 (2014).
155. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 15, at 1920, 1933–34; see also Tweedy, supra note 19, at 142–43
(discussing City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005), a case about local jurisdiction
to tax within the boundaries of a historic Indian reservation); Royster, supra note 31, at 37 (noting that,
as of the publication of that article, tribes had only won one case concerning diminishment or
disestablishment in the past two decades); Carpenter v. Murphy, 139 S. Ct. 626 (2018) (ordering further
briefing on jurisdictional issues). The Supreme Court’s June 2021 decision in Cooley is a rare example of
a tribal win in the jurisdiction context. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638.
156. See, e.g., John R. Hermann, American Indians in Court: The Burger and Rehnquist Years, 37 SOC.
SCI. J. 245, 253–54 (2000); see also Berger, supra note 15, at 1939.
157. Berger, supra note 15, at 1910–11. See generally Bay Mills, 572 U.S. 782.
158. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
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represented a solid (though precarious) win for the Tribe and was
certainly more neutral in tone than Kiowa Tribe, although it still did
not approach the level of respect in its tone that we see in McGirt.159
For example, rather than unequivocally highlighting tribal sovereignty
as an important basis for the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, the
Bay Mills opinion repeatedly refers to tribes using the somewhat
depreciative “domestic dependent nations”160 language that dates back
to 1831 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia,161 and it also refers to tribes more sharply as
“dependents . . . subject to plenary control by Congress.”162 Moreover,
beyond tone, with the opinion’s analysis primarily focused on
precedent and stare decisis, the opinion does not substantially add to
the jurisprudence of tribal sovereignty.
Parker, to recap briefly, while well-written, did not evince the sense
of respect for tribes as governments that we see in McGirt, nor did it
examine fairness questions from the Tribe’s perspective.163 An overtly
respectful tone regarding tribes is important in federal Indian law
decisions because, not only does it encourage others who interact with
tribes to treat them fairly,164 but it also undoubtedly affects the level of
fairness to tribes in the Court’s framing of common law rules
applicable to them. Just as decisions that employ a belittling attitude
toward tribes and describe them in racist ways have created bad law

159. See generally Bay Mills, 572 U.S. 782; Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. 751.
160. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788, 803.
161. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
162. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788. Professor Matthew Fletcher has described how the notion of
dependency, although previously often evoking more of a protectorate relationship, has come to be a
loaded term that is most often used by the Court to eviscerate aspects of tribal sovereign rights. Fletcher,
supra note 84 (manuscript at 12, 20–25). Although Justice Kagan may not have intended to invoke that
view in Bay Mills, references to tribes as “dependents” now unavoidably carry a great deal of baggage.
See Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788.
163. See discussion supra Section I.A.
164. Cf. Plains Com. Bank v. Long Fam. Land & Cattle Co., Nos. 03-002-A & R-120-99, slip op. at
18–19 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2004) (discussing a non-member Bank’s disrespect for
the Cheyenne River Sioux judicial system, which it boldly articulated to the tribal appellate court during
argument), rev’d, 554 U.S. 316 (2008); Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments: A Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. REV. 311, 331 (2000) (discussing the
mixed message implicit in the tribal exhaustion doctrine and explaining how the “extreme scrutiny” it
provides for tribal court jurisdictional determinations “encourages . . . disrespect” of tribal court
judgments).
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that continues to plague tribes to this day, 165 we can expect the reverse
to be true (although there have been fewer opportunities to examine
the reverse in action): that the decisions that contribute the most to the
jurisprudence of tribal sovereignty and that are among the fairest to
tribes are likely to be those that adopt a respectful tone.
The other case from that term that was a clear win for tribal interests,
Bryant, involved the question of whether uncounseled tribal court
convictions could constitute predicate offenses in a federal domestic
violence habitual offender statute. 166 The Court’s decision to allow the
use of uncounseled tribal court convictions as predicate offenses was
beneficial to tribes because reservations tend to be plagued by
domestic violence (among other types of violence against Native
women and other Native individuals), which is often committed by
outsiders.167 As Professor Bethany Berger has noted, the result of the
case was very beneficial for tribes in facilitating the removal of some
of the most egregious repeat offenders from reservations, but the
opinion unfortunately did not focus on tribal sovereignty and comity
as the bases for recognition of the tribal court convictions; thus it
created some potentially bad law in the criminal arena as a result.168
Bryant, like Parker, was therefore helpful to tribes but did not add to
the jurisprudence of tribal sovereignty, and Bryant also did not shed as
much light as it could have on the reasons that tribal court convictions
are deserving of respect in the federal system.
Finally, there was a tribal loss in the 2015 Supreme Court term on
an issue concerning equitable tolling of a statute of limitations,169 and
there was also an extremely important tribal jurisdiction case that split
4–4 after Justice Scalia passed away, resulting in the affirmance of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision upholding tribal
jurisdiction.170 Although this jurisdiction case, Dollar General Corp.
165. Tweedy, supra note 122, at 738–39.
166. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1961 (2016).
167. Id. at 1959; Berger, supra note 15, at 1926; see also Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14,
at 689–91.
168. Berger, supra note 15, at 1931–33.
169. See generally Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U.S. 250 (2016).
170. See generally Dollar General Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (per
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v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians,171 was vitally important to
tribes, as a Supreme Court decision, it lacks all precedential value.172
Therefore, from a theoretical standpoint, it does not qualify as a true
Supreme Court win.
Since the 2015 term, there have been some additional wins, two of
which were in the area of treaty usufructuary rights and related treaty
rights.173 A plurality opinion striking down a fuel importation tax as
unlawfully burdening the Yakama Tribe’s treaty right to travel
represents one of these treaty-rights wins.174 The other is a 5–4
decision upholding the continued viability of the Crow Tribe’s treaty
hunting right within the Bighorn National Forest. 175 The importance of
these two cases should not be underestimated, and the plurality opinion
in Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc. (the
right-to-travel case) and Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion in
Herrera v. Wyoming (the hunting case) are strongly written
affirmances of tribal rights and both emphasize the necessity of
treating the tribal parties fairly in light of the vast amounts of land they
gave up based on promises that they could retain other rights.176 The
wins in these cases, although precarious in terms of the dividedness of
curiam), aff’g by an equally divided court Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d
167 (5th Cir. 2014); Berger, supra note 15, at 1938. Another important case for Alaska Native Villages,
although not a federal Indian law case per se, was Sturgeon v. Frost, which rejected the federal
government’s regulatory authority over a stretch of river in Alaska under the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act. See generally 136 S. Ct. 1061 (2016) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 3102(4)).
171. 136 S. Ct. 2159.
172. See, e.g., Ryan Black & Lee Epstein, Recusals and the “Problem” of an Equally Divided Supreme
Court, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 75, 81 (2005).
173. See generally Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019); Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing v.
Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000 (2019) (plurality opinion) (finding a treaty right to travel that limits
state taxing authority). An additional case in which tribal interests prevailed was Patchak v. Zinke, which
upheld a statute stripping the federal courts of jurisdiction to continue to hear a landowner’s challenge to
the federal government’s decision to take land into trust on behalf of a tribe. 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018). A
fourth case, involving whether the treaty right to fish includes a right to protection of habitat, split 4–4,
resulting in affirmance of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in the Tribes’ favor.
Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018) (per curiam), aff’g by an equally divided court 864
F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2017). A fifth recent case, Lewis v. Clarke, constituted a loss for tribes. 137 S. Ct.
1285 (2017). In Lewis, a tribal employee committed an off-reservation tort while on duty, and the Supreme
Court held that he could be sued in his individual capacity in state court notwithstanding the tribe’s
sovereign immunity. Id. at 1293.
174. See generally Cougar Den, 139 S. Ct. 1000 (plurality opinion).
175. See generally Herrera, 139 S. Ct. 1686.
176. See generally Cougar Den, 139 S. Ct. 1000 (plurality opinion); Herrera, 139 S. Ct. 1686.
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the Court, are less unusual than the win in McGirt because tribes seem
to be generally more likely to win in pure treaty rights cases than in
other types of cases. For example, historically, tribes have won treaty
usufructuary rights cases during periods when they were losing most
other types of cases.177 And some Justices seem more amenable to pure
tribal treaty rights claims than to tribal jurisdiction or reservation
boundary claims.178 It is possible that this is because the exercise of
treaty rights somehow meshes with non-Indians’ stereotypes of Native
peoples or perhaps, more pragmatically, because the exercise of treaty
rights does not involve any direct tribal authority over non-tribal
citizens. At any rate, these recent treaty rights wins, although crucial
to the maintenance of tribal cultures, are not as striking in terms of
Supreme Court jurisprudence as the win in McGirt.
There is a post-McGirt case that yielded a remarkable result in the
tribal criminal jurisdiction context, although the reasoning is curious
and the language, although not disrespectful, does not exude the level
of respect for tribal sovereignty that we see in McGirt.179 In United
States v. Cooley,180 the Court unanimously upheld a tribal officer’s
authority to detain and search a non-Native driver who appeared to be
impaired, had a loaded semi-automatic weapon as well as drug
paraphernalia with him, and had his young child in the car.181 The
detention was allowed pending transfer to state or federal officers that
had jurisdiction.182 The nine-page opinion rests primarily on the
Court’s civil jurisdiction precedent without explaining why this
precedent should be extended to the criminal context in the

177. See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
178. The late Justice Ginsburg is one example of such a Justice. Her relatively dismal early record in
federal Indian cases did not begin to turn around until 2005. See Carole Goldberg, Finding the Way to
Indian Country: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Decisions in Indian Law Cases, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1003,
1014–15, 1032 (2009). She nonetheless joined the five-Justice majority in a seminal treaty rights case in
1999. See generally Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172.
179. See generally United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1641; see also United States v. Cooley, 919 F.3d 1135, 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2019) (reciting the
facts of the case), rev’d, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021).
182. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. at 1641, 1643.

Published by Reading Room, 2021

35

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 4

774

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:3

circumstances at hand.183 The discussion of precedent relating to tribal
civil jurisdiction appears to be loosely based on an argument the
United States made in its brief; specifically, the United States asserted
that one of the exceptions to the general divestment of tribal civil
jurisdiction over non-members on fee lands delineated in Montana v.
United States,184 viz the exception that allows for tribal civil
jurisdiction where there is a threat or direct effect on tribal health or
welfare, “reflects a general principle that supports the more modest
ability to protect the public from imminent danger and to aid federal
and state law enforcement.”185 Rather than spelling out that it was
extracting a wider, general principle from the Montana case, as the
United States advocated, the Court in Cooley appears to simply apply
Montana in the criminal context, raising questions about whether the
Court’s civil jurisdiction test has somehow now crept into the criminal
context as well.186 Despite the curiousness of the Court’s analysis, the
result in Cooley is a clear win for tribes on a jurisdictional question—
an area of law where such wins have been few and far between. 187
Although the mismatch between the legal question posed in Cooley
and the precedent applied means that the opinion does not strongly
further predictability in the Court’s Indian law jurisprudence, 188 the
win does suggest that McGirt may well have paved the way for
Supreme Court decisions that are more amenable to recognizing tribal
rights.189
183. Id. at 1641 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981), and stating without
explanation that “[w]e believe this statement of law governs here”).
184. 450 U.S. 544.
185. Brief of Petitioner at 25–26, Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (No. 19-1414), 2021 WL 103640, at *25–26.
186. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. at 1641.
187. Other tribal wins in the jurisdiction context include Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), and United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
188. One sense in which the Cooley decision does further predictability is in its reliance on a statement
in past precedent to the effect that such detentions by tribal officers were allowed. See supra note 114
(discussing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990)).
189. The Court decided another case dealing with tribal and Native rights in 2021: Yellen v.
Confederation Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation, Nos. 20-543, 20-544, 2021 WL 2599432 (June 25,
2021). At issue was a technical question as to whether Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) qualify as
“Tribal government[s]” under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 9001–12, 9021–34, 9041–63, 9071–80, scattered sections of title 21 and 22 of the U.S. code,
42 U.S.C. § 801, 33 U.S.C. § 2238b-1, 2 U.S.C. § 5548, and 17 U.S.C.A. § 710 (West 2021). Yellen, 2021
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III. UNCERTAINTY IN THE WAKE OF JUSTICE GINSBURG’S DEATH
Justice Ginsburg, who passed away from cancer in September 2020,
was part of the slim 5–4 Majority in McGirt.190 While her early record
as a Supreme Court Justice in ruling on federal Indian law cases left a
great deal to be desired, her decisions as to tribal rights appeared to
improve over time, particularly after apparently having reached a
turning point in 2005.191 Though her record after 2005 remained
mixed—for example, she disliked both tribal and state sovereign
immunity and therefore voted against the tribe in Bay Mills 192—she
cast favorable votes for tribes in other recent cases and wrote the
majority opinion in Bryant.193 Another indication of her apparent
change of heart regarding tribal interests is her statement that the
decision she most regretted was City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian
Nation,194 in which she employed colorful language to reject a tribe’s
immunity from local taxes, insisting that the “embers” of its
sovereignty over the area in question had “long” grown “cold.”195
Additionally, to reach this result, she invoked the equitable defense of
laches, which was neither briefed by the parties nor supported by the
factual record and the application of which to federally protected tribal

WL 2599432, at *2. Because there was tension between the interests of urban Alaska Natives and those
of federally recognized tribes in the case, Brief for Cook Inlet Region, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 1–2, Yellen, 2021 WL 2599432 (Nos. 20-543, 20-544), 2021 WL 915949, at *1–2, and
because the case solely involved a technical, statutory interpretation issue, Yellen, 2021 WL 2599432, at
*2, it is difficult to characterize the opinion in terms whether it supports or derogates tribal and Native
rights.
190. See generally McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
191. Goldberg, supra note 178, at 1014–15.
192. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 831–32 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Neither
brand [i.e., tribal or state] of immoderate, judicially confirmed immunity, I anticipate, will have staying
power.”).
193. See generally United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016); see also Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S.
Ct. 897, 912–13 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc.,
139 S. Ct. 1000, 1016–21 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Plains Com. Bank v. Long Fam. Land & Cattle
Co., 554 U.S. 316, 342–52 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part).
194. 544 U.S. 197 (2005); Oliver O’Connell, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Greatest Regret Revealed,
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 22, 2020, 6:13 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/ruthbader-ginsburg-supreme-court-regret-oneida-nation-sherill-native-americans-b534565.html.
195. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 214.
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rights had been previously rejected.196 Although the decision itself
remains a bitter pill for anyone who cares about tribal rights, her
ultimate recognition of its injustice was a heartening development and
exemplifies the fact that Supreme Court Justices sometimes do evolve
considerably in their thinking on specific issues. Thus, despite having
written and joined her share of poor decisions relating to tribes, Justice
Ginsburg’s jurisprudence on tribal sovereignty had some bright spots
and seemed to be arcing toward justice in the later stages of her career.
Justice Ginsburg has now been replaced by Justice Barrett, a
self-proclaimed protégé of the late Justice Scalia and a Justice whose
views on some issues, such as gender equality, may well turn out to be
the inverse of those of Justice Ginsburg.197 Given Justice Barrett’s
short tenure as a judge (she was appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in 2017 and previously served as a law
professor at the conservative University of Notre Dame Law School),
it is difficult to read the tea leaves as to how she might rule on Indian
law cases. In light of her self-professed adherence to Justice Scalia’s
judicial philosophy and his textualist approach,198 one clue might be

196. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 132; Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 683 n.157.
197. Compare Emma Brown et al., Amy Coney Barrett Served As a ‘Handmaid’ in Christian Group
People
of
Praise,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
6,
2020,
8:09
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/amy-coney-barrett-people-ofpraise/2020/10/06/5f497d8c-0781-11eb-859b-f9c27abe638d_story.html [https://perma.cc/PP9E-NMM5]
(describing Justice Barrett’s former role as “handmaid” or women’s leader in a far-right Catholic group
called “People of Praise” in which women are required to submit to their husbands and acknowledge them
as their “heads”), with Melissa Block, Pathmarking the Way: Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Lifelong Fight for
Gender
Equality,
NPR
(Sept.
24,
2020,
3:00
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/09/24/916377135/pathmarking-the-way-ruth-bader-ginsburgs-lifelong-fightfor-gender-equality [https://perma.cc/X8UM-XT4K] (describing Justice Ginsburg’s considerable legacy
of furthering gender equality); see also Amy Coney Barrett Senate Confirmation Hearing Day 2
Transcript, REV: TRANSCRIPTS (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/amy-coney-barrettsenate-confirmation-hearing-day-2-transcript [https://perma.cc/288A-39BR] [hereinafter Barrett
Confirmation Hearing] (“I would say that Justice Scalia was obviously a mentor, and as I said when I
accepted the President’s nomination, that his philosophy is mine too.”); Mary Annette Pember, Amy Coney
Barrett and the Fate of Native Adoption Law, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Oct. 12, 2020),
https://indiancountrytoday.com/news/amy-coney-barrett-and-the-fate-of-native-adoption-law4oKdAmOCKUq-HDbZ2fj5sQ [https://perma.cc/G6HL-9UC5] (explaining that People of Praise has
been accused by past members of subjugating women).
198. Barrett Confirmation Hearing, supra note 197; Amy Coney Barrett: USSC Nomination
Acceptance Address, AM. RHETORIC: ONLINE SPEECH BANK (Sept. 26, 2020),
https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/amyconeybarrettusscnominationacceptance.htm
[https://perma.cc/X8PB-JGJS].
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Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence on federal Indian law, which, as
discussed briefly above,199 is extremely problematic for tribes. On the
other hand, however, Justice Barrett did express openness to the Indian
law canons in one of her law review articles,200 so there is some cause
for hope that she may demonstrate more fidelity to precedent and core
Indian law principles than did Justice Scalia. Her joinder of the
unanimous opinion in Cooley is also a promising sign.201 Furthermore,
Supreme Court Justices’ rulings on Indian law appear to be less tied to
their conservative or liberal ideologies than their rulings in other areas,
as well as being more likely to evolve after their appointment to the
Supreme Court.202
A. Justice Scalia’s Indian Law Jurisprudence As a Possible Model
for Justice Barrett
If Justice Barrett were to decide to follow Justice Scalia’s lead on
cases that raise federal Indian law issues, this would undoubtedly
foster continued unpredictability in the Court’s Indian law
jurisprudence and would inculcate a sense of hopelessness among
tribes and tribal advocates. As described above, Justice Scalia did not
believe adherence to precedent was required in the field of federal
Indian law,203 and as demonstrated by Professor Matthew Fletcher,
despite the late Justice’s attachment to textualism, he usually failed to
engage with the relevant texts in Indian law, instead elevating the
interests of non-Indian opponents of tribal jurisdiction and other

199. See discussion supra Section I.A.
200. Amy Coney Barrett, Substance Canons & Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 151–52 (2010);
see also Memorandum from Joel West Williams, Senior Staff Att’y, Native Am. Rights Fund, on
Nomination of Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court 3–4 (Oct. 6, 2020) [hereinafter NARF
Memorandum], https://sct.narf.org/articles/indian_law_jurispurdence/amy_coney_barrett_indian_law.pd
f [https://perma.cc/8H2E-XRGC].
201. United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021); see also supra notes 179–189 and accompanying
text.
202. Grant Christensen, Judging Indian Law: What Factors Influence Individual Justice’s Votes on
Indian Law in the Modern Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 267, 269–72, 293 (2012).
203. See discussion supra Section I.A.
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sovereign rights, apparently because of a personal proclivity for, or
identification with, such interests.204
Justice Scalia’s record on tribal rights was poor although not
absolutely bleak. In a study of individual Justices’ rulings in the area
of Indian law from 1959 through 2010, Professor Grant Christensen
found that Justice Scalia had voted for tribal interests 17.5% of the
time.205 This was roughly the same percentage as Justice Kennedy, a
modicum higher than Justice Thomas’s 12.2%, and a substantial
improvement on Chief Justice Roberts’s and Justice Alito’s abysmal
0%, though the latter two were quite new to the Court at that time.206
Among Justice Scalia’s most notable votes in favor of tribal interests
are two Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)207 cases, Mississippi Band
of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,208 in which he voted with the majority
to enforce the statute and transfer jurisdiction to the tribal court, and
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,209 in which he partially joined Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent and penned his own dissent, with both dissents
arguing that the majority should have applied the statute to protect the
biological father’s parental rights.210 As to the Holyfield case, he did
comment decades later that he found it “very hard” to follow the
ICWA in that case, suggesting that he felt constrained to do so by the
clear statutory language. 211 Thus, even when he voted for tribal rights
204. See generally Fletcher, supra note 7; see also id. at 126 (discussing Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001)).
205. Christensen, supra note 202, at 292. The Native American Rights Fund reports that Justice Scalia’s
full voting record shows that he voted in favor of tribal interests only 14% of the time. NARF
Memorandum, supra note 200, at 5.
206. Christensen, supra note 202, at 292. For more on Chief Justice Roberts’s disappointing record in
the field of federal Indian law, see Peter Scott Vicaire, Two Roads Diverged: A Comparative Analysis of
Indigenous Rights in a North American Constitutional Context, 58 MCGILL L.J. 607, 644 & n.185 (2013).
207. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–03, 1911–23, 1931–34, 1951, 1952, 1961, 1963.
208. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
209. 570 U.S. 637 (2013).
210. Id. at 667–92 (Scalia, J., dissenting, and joining dissent in part).
211. Adam Liptak, Case Pits Adoptive Parents Against Tribal Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2012),
https://nyti.ms/WBopZV [https://perma.cc/Z4SB-PMVE]. Some have also voiced concern about how
Justice Barrett might approach ICWA cases because she herself has adopted two children from Haiti who
are thus of a different race and national origin from her. Pember, supra note 197. It is impossible to know
if Barrett’s status as a white adoptive parent of Haitian children will influence her approach to ICWA, and
unfortunately, she was not asked about the ICWA during her confirmation hearings. See Barrett
Confirmation Hearing, supra note 197. One aspect of her adoption experience that may suggest that it is
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based on statutory text, he, at least in some cases, felt ambivalent about
it. And although his dissent in Adoptive Couple could arguably be
chalked up to a penchant for father’s rights,212 he did vote to uphold
tribal rights in a smattering of other cases, including his vote with the
majority in Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter,213 which held the
federal government to its statutory obligation to pay contract support
costs under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act,214 despite Congress’s failure to appropriate sufficient funds.
Nonetheless, his slim record of cases in favor of tribal rights is
dwarfed by his strident and unnuanced rejection of such rights in many
others.215 One particularly troubling example is his majority opinion in
Nevada v. Hicks,216 an opinion denying a tribal court’s jurisdiction
over civil rights claims against state officers relating to an
on-reservation search. Although the bare result may not be entirely
surprising in the abstract, the opinion wreaked a good deal of collateral
damage. The opinion is problematic in (1) seeming to extend the

less likely to negatively dispose her towards the ICWA is that she and her husband did not adopt because
of an inability to have children themselves and in fact have five biological children. Dora Nuss-Warren,
Who Are Amy Coney Barrett’s Children?, MOMS.COM (Sept. 26, 2020), https://www.moms.com/amyconey-barretts-children/ [https://perma.cc/2JF5-Z8TF]. Thus, she is perhaps less likely than some
adoptive parents to be concerned that the ICWA in effect shrinks the pool of children available for
adoption by childless couples. See, e.g., Bethany R. Berger, In the Name of the Child: Race, Gender, and
Economics in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 67 FLA. L. REV. 295, 299, 353–54 (2015) (describing the
commodification of adoption and the increasing demand for adoptable babies by privileged, upper-middle
class couples). In light of the Fifth Circuit’s very recent fractured en banc decision on the ICWA, it is
possible that we will know Justice Barrett’s views on ICWA quite soon. See generally Brackeen v.
Haaland, 994 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2021) (en banc).
212. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 136.
213. 567 U.S. 182 (2012).
214. 25 U.S.C. §§ 13a, 5301–02, 5304–08, 5321–25, 5328–32, 5345–47, 5351–56, 5361–77, 5381–99,
5411–13, 5421–23; 42 U.S.C. § 2004b.
215. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 7, at 118; see also United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287
(2009) (Scalia, J., authoring the majority opinion rejecting a breach of trust claim against the federal
government based on its covert dealings with a coal company regarding on-reservation mineral leases
while an administrative appeal involving the Navajo Nation and the coal company was pending); Plains
Com. Bank v. Long Fam. Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008) (Scalia, J., joining the majority opinion
rejecting tribal court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate discrimination claims relating to an off-reservation bank’s
treatment of an on-reservation business, the majority of which was owned by tribal members); Lyng v.
Nw. Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (Scalia, J., joining Justice O’Connor’s majority
opinion rejecting tribes’ free exercise claim relating to National Forest lands); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S.
399 (1994) (Scalia, J., joining the majority opinion finding a reservation to have been diminished based
on “public domain” language that had not previously been recognized as a basis for diminishment).
216. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
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application of the extremely demanding test that must be met for a tribe
to exercise civil jurisdiction over non-member activities on fee lands
to tribally owned lands,217 (2) adding a grossly subjective exception to
the requirement that litigants exhaust tribal court remedies before
seeking relief in federal courts, (3) seeming to minimize the likelihood
of the Court’s upholding tribal jurisdiction over non-member
defendants, and (4) suggesting that states have considerable authority
within the bounds of Indian country. 218 It is safe to say that, if Justice
Barrett were to follow in Justice Scalia’s shoes in the context of Indian
law cases, it would be a disaster for Indian country.
B. Justice Barrett’s Participation in Indian Law Cases on the
Seventh Circuit and on the Supreme Court
The only Indian law case Justice Barrett appears to have participated
in as a judge on the Seventh Circuit was a per curiam case involving a
prisoner’s statutory claim that his right to practice his Native religion
was being infringed upon by the prison.219 It is difficult to glean a sense
of Justice Barrett’s view of the statutory claims to free exercise of
religion because of the procedural posture of the case. The trial court
had at first rejected the prisoner’s claims on summary judgment, and
the Seventh Circuit had, before Justice Barrett was appointed, reversed
and remanded for trial.220 At trial, the prisoner had prevailed on most
claims but, proceeding pro se, appealed on claims and issues he had
lost—the most important of which was his contention that he was
entitled to fresh (rather than dried) game meat for religious
ceremonies.221 The Seventh Circuit panel, in which Justice Barrett
participated, affirmed. 222 However, given that it was the earlier
217. Id. at 374. But see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Formalism and Judicial Supremacy in Federal Indian
Law, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 391, 406 (2008) (advocating for a narrow reading of Hicks that is linked to
its specific factual context); COHEN, supra note 47, § 4.02 (same).
218. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 678–79, 684 n.159 (citing Gloria Valencia-Weber,
The Supreme Court’s Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from Constitutional Principles and the Crafting
of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405, 407 (2003)).
219. See generally Schlemm v. Carr, 760 F. App’x 431 (7th Cir. 2019) (per curiam); NARF
Memorandum, supra note 200, at 3.
220. Schlemm v. Wall, 784 F.3d 362, 363 (7th Cir. 2015).
221. Schlemm v. Wall, No. 11-CV-272, 2015 WL 2371944, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 21, 2015).
222. Carr, 760 F. App’x at 432–33.
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appellate panel that reversed the summary judgment ruling, that the
prisoner was proceeding pro se, that he had won most of his claims at
trial, and that tribes and Native individuals tend to have an uphill battle
in succeeding on religious exercise claims generally, 223 his loss before
a panel in which Justice Barrett participated does not seem remarkable.
Accordingly, Justice Barrett’s brief judicial service on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit does not shed much, if
any, light on how she might rule on Indian law issues.
As this Article goes to press, Justice Barrett has participated in two
cases during her six-month tenure on the Supreme Court that raise
federal Indian law issues. The more illuminating of the two is her
joinder of the unanimous opinion in United States v. Cooley,224 in
which the Court upheld a tribal officer’s power to detain and search a
non-Native criminal suspect encountered on the reservation over
whom the tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction. Although the Court’s
reasoning in the case is somewhat mystifying, it is a hopeful sign that
Justice Barrett joined a decision that will have the effect of protecting
reservation communities and tribal law enforcement from potentially
violent criminal suspects. 225 Justice Barrett’s questions during oral
argument in Cooley were also thoughtful and searching, although she
appeared to be assuming—at least for the purposes of her questions—
the correctness of problematic statements in prior case law to the effect
that subjecting non-members to tribal civil jurisdiction would be unfair
due to their lack of participation in tribal law-making.226
The other case raising federal Indian law issues in which Justice
Barrett participated, Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis
Reservation,227 a statutory interpretation case, was complex in that the
223. See, e.g., Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876–79 (1990); Lyng v.
Nw. Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 452–53 (1988); Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535
F.3d 1058, 1071 n.14 (9th Cir. 2008).
224. 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021).
225. See supra notes 179–189 and accompanying text; Cooley, 141 S. Ct. at 1643; see also Brief of
Petitioner, supra note 185, at 6 (discussing the threat of violence posed by the suspect in Cooley).
226. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27–30, 59–62, Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (No. 19-1414); Tweedy,
supra note 56, at 153, 156–60 (discussing problems with the Court’s notion that non-members generally
should not be subject to tribal jurisdiction because, as non-members who cannot participate in tribal
law-making, they have not “consented” to such jurisdiction).
227. Nos. 20-543, 20-544, 2021 WL 2599432 (June 25, 2021).
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interests of urban Alaska Natives were in tension with the interests of
federally recognized tribes.228 Accordingly, her joinder in the majority
opinion, which concluded that Alaska Native Corporations qualified
as tribes for purposes of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security (CARES) Act, 229 does not provide a clear indication of Justice
Barrett’s level of respect for tribal sovereignty.
To sum up Justice Barrett’s Supreme Court jurisprudence to date,
her participation in the unanimous Cooley decision is a positive sign.
However, the unanimity of the decision means that her joinder does
not elucidate where she is likely to fall in the Court’s more common,
fractured Indian law decisions.
C. Justice Barrett As a Judicial Clerk
Justice Barrett undoubtedly was exposed to federal Indian law cases
as a judicial clerk, first for Judge Silberman of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and then for Justice Scalia. 230 Because of
confidentiality rules for law clerks, however, it is impossible to know
the extent of her role on any given case or even which cases she worked
on that came before the D.C. Circuit or the Supreme Court while she
was clerking.231 We do know that, as a clerk for Justice Scalia, she
participated in the writing of memoranda on whether cases for which
writs of certiorari had been filed should be taken up by the Supreme
Court based on factors such as whether the decision was in conflict
with cases from other federal circuits or state supreme courts.232 Thus,
as a Supreme Court clerk, she may well have had experience
228. See supra note 189.
229. See supra note 189.
230. Amy Howe, Potential Nominee Profile: Amy Coney Barrett, SCOTUS BLOG (July 4, 2018, 2:40
PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/potential-nominee-profile-amy-coney-barrett/
[https://perma.cc/59QL-HHZE].
231. FED. JUD. CTR., MAINTAINING THE PUBLIC TRUST: ETHICS FOR FEDERAL JUDICIAL LAW CLERKS
5–7 (2d ed. 2011).
232. Elizabeth Slattery, Amy Coney Barrett, in Her Own Words, PAC. LEGAL FOUND. (Nov. 11, 2020),
https://pacificlegal.org/amy-coney-barrett-in-her-own-words/ [https://perma.cc/5PV2-H7FG] (reporting
on an interview with Justice Barrett in which she describes drafting memorandums for the “cert pool”);
NARF Memorandum, supra note 200, at 4; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The
Certiorari Process As Barrier to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 940–42 (2009)
(describing the cert pool process and the standards by which the Supreme Court evaluates cases for
possible review).
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evaluating Indian law cases for possible grants of certiorari in addition
to experience analyzing accepted cases and potentially making
recommendations to Justice Scalia as to how to rule on them.
Among the small handful of Indian law cases that came before the
Court in some fashion during Justice Barrett’s clerkship, two stand out
as particularly notable. Justice Scalia joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
dissent in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,233
rejecting the Majority’s holding that the treaty hunting and fishing
rights of the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians remained intact.
Additionally, the petition for a writ of certiorari in Rice v. Cayetano
appears to have been filed during Justice Barrett’s clerkship.234 Thus,
it is possible that Justice Barrett played a role in the Court’s decision
to accept certiorari in that case. After Justice Barrett’s clerkship with
Justice Scalia had ended, the Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in that case and held that, under the
Fifteenth Amendment, voting in Hawaii’s special elections for trustees
to manage trust property for the benefit of Native Hawaiians had to be
open to all citizens of Hawaii, rather than just to Native Hawaiians. 235
As discussed below, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Mille Lacs,
which Justice Scalia joined, is extremely problematic for tribes,
particularly because it would perversely erase the tribal perspective
from the Indian law canons. 236 In Rice, the Supreme Court ultimately
sidestepped the issue of whether Native Hawaiians should be
considered to have a special relationship to the United States that is
similar or identical to that of tribes on the mainland.237 The Court
decided the case, instead, based on the Fifteenth Amendment. 238
However, in so holding, the Court reversed a strong Ninth Circuit
decision rooted in trust principles that mirror those applied in the

233. 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
234. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818). Though Rice
is not an Indian law case per se, cases raising issues with respect to the status of Native Hawaiians are
analogous to those in the field of federal Indian law.
235. 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
236. See infra note 251 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172).
237. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 201.
238. Rice, 528 U.S.at 498–99.
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federal Indian law context. 239 Thus, the dissent in Mille Lacs and the
majority in Rice are both troubling from a federal Indian law
perspective, but the Mille Lacs dissent is unquestionably the worse of
the two. Again, however, we do not know whether Justice Barrett
played any role in Justice Scalia’s decision to join the Mille Lacs
dissent or in the Court’s decision to grant certiorari in Rice.
D. Justice Barrett’s Scholarship
Another possible window into Justice Barrett’s approach to Indian
law cases is any scholarship from her time as a law professor that bears
on Indian law issues. The most likely contender in this area is the
aforementioned law review article in which she examines canons of
statutory interpretation and assesses whether it is proper for a textualist
like herself to apply them (because the use of canons could potentially
lead to an interpretation of a statute that is not closely aligned with the
text).240 The title and theme of the article have religious (specifically
Christian) connotations—Substantive Canons and Faithful
Agency241—with the reference to faithfulness seeming to lend a
religious air to the exercise of interpreting statutes as well as a
conservative flavor to the article.
Justice Barrett’s short section on the Indian law canons
acknowledges that these particular canons are not a core part of her
project because the Indian law canons originated in treaty
interpretation rather than statutory interpretation (and her main
concern in the article is with statutory interpretation), but nonetheless,
her analysis seems to reflect an openness to the validity of these canons
and a willingness to apply them or see them applied, although she stops
short of a wholesale endorsement. 242
Justice Barrett first traces the Indian law canons back to their origins
in the Marshall Court’s decision in Patterson v. Jenks.243 She then
notes that, after the Court’s decision a few years later in Worcester v.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075, 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
See generally Barrett, supra note 200.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 151–52.
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 216, 229 (1829); Barrett, supra note 200, at 151.
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Georgia,244 which also applied the canons, the Indian law canons lay
dormant for thirty-four years and were only applied in two additional
cases in the nineteenth century.245 Her assertion here is that because of
their sparse application in their early years, the canons may not have
been as “well-settled” as the twentieth century Court understood them
to be.246 However, besides the fact that, in privileging nineteenth
century case law, she is also privileging the outmoded and inegalitarian
perspectives of the white men who created it,247 in making this
statement, Barrett importantly does not acknowledge the procedural
obstacles that prevented tribes from suing in most cases until the latter
part of the twentieth century. 248 The fact that, for the most part, tribes
could not get into court during the period in which she finds the use of
the canons to be lacking is ample explanation for the apparent
infrequency of their use during that period. However, to be fair, Justice
Barrett makes a point of explaining that she is not saying that it is
“wrong to apply the Indian canon to statutes,” and, importantly, she
favorably cites the late Phil Frickey’s analysis supporting application
of the Indian canons to statutes in a footnote. 249 Given Frickey’s
prominence as an Indian law scholar, Justice Barrett’s evident respect
for his work is a good sign for Indian country.
Justice Barrett’s brief discussion of the Indian law canons leaves
one with the impression that, although she is not well-versed in Indian
law, she may be favorably disposed towards the Indian law canons. At
the same time, her discussion of their origin suggests that she is not
without some level of skepticism. Although the Indian law canons do
not figure prominently in her analysis, with respect to canons that
apply in the context of statutory interpretation generally, she ultimately

244. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 541 (1832).
245. Barrett, supra note 200, at 151.
246. Id. at 151–52.
247. See generally, Fletcher, supra note 7.
248. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 101 (7th ed.
2020).
249. Barrett, supra note 200, at 152 & n.206 (citing Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present:
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. Rev. 381, 421–
22 (1993)).
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concludes that the use of such canons is permissible if they “promote[]
constitutional values” in their application in a given instance. 250
As to the application of the Indian law canons, then, Justice Barrett
is likely an improvement over Justice Scalia, who, based on his votes
in Indian law cases, cannot be said to have been a proponent of the
Indian law canons,251 and who failed to even mention them once in the
book he co-authored on canons.252
E. Concluding Thoughts on Justice Barrett
It is hard to predict, based on the limited information we have, how
Justice Barrett might vote in Indian law cases. Given her lack of
experience in the area, it is also quite possible that her views as to
Indian law and tribal rights, whatever they might be now, will evolve
while she is on the Court. Although there is room for cautious
optimism that she will be more respectful of and open to tribal rights
than was Justice Scalia, how much more respectful and open she may
be is impossible to know. She did appear humble in her answers to
250. Barrett, supra note 200, at 181.
251. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 218 (1999)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Mille Lacs, which
rejected the majority’s robust use of the canons to uphold the Tribe’s usufructuary rights against a claim
that they had been extinguished. Id. The dissent instead suggested that the Indian law canons, which are
supposed to privilege the Indian treaty signatory’s understanding, should only come into play if ‘“learned
lawyers’ of the day would probably have offered differing interpretations of the [treaty language].” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443
U.S. 658, 677 (1979)). One modest counterpoint to Justice Scalia’s decision to join the Mille Lacs dissent
was his opinion for the Court in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation. 502 U.S. 251 (1992). That case concerned the statutory interpretation of the General Allotment
Act, specifically whether it permitted Washington to impose ad valorem and excise taxes on allotted lands
that the Yakama Indian Nation or its members held in fee. Id. at 254 (citing General Allotment (Dawes)
Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-105, 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–34, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349,
354, 381) (§§ 331–33 repealed 2000)). The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, held that the
ad valorem tax was permissible based on the Act but that the excise tax was not. Id. at 270. The opinion
has been rightly criticized for its failure to take the Indian law canons into account with respect to the ad
valorem tax. Royster, supra note 31, at 24. In fact, the Court could not find explicit authorization for the
tax in the General Allotment Act, so it instead relied on a related federal statute that was not directly
applicable to uphold the tax. Id. at 22. At the same time, however, the Court did use the canons in a
conservative way to resolve statutory ambiguity in favor of the Yakama Indian Nation when it struck
down the excise tax, and, in doing so, it went so far as to refer to the canons as “deeply rooted.” Cnty. of
Yakima, 502 U.S. at 268–69. Thus, Justice Scalia cannot be said to have completely discounted the Indian
law canons of construction, although County of Yakima appears to be an isolated example and, even so,
is a mixed bag in terms of the canons. See generally id.
252. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 136.
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questions during her confirmation hearings,253 which is probably a
good sign, because humility is a necessity for any outsider to begin to
understand tribal perspectives and the effects of colonial policies and
laws on tribes and Native individuals.
CONCLUSION
The majority opinion in McGirt, when read in conjunction with the
decision in Parker, brings much-needed coherence to the twin
doctrines of diminishment and disestablishment. Moreover, the
majority in McGirt was able to summon respect for tribal sovereignty
and an understanding of the need for fairness to tribes that is seldom
seen in Supreme Court decisions, particularly those in areas of law like
diminishment and disestablishment that implicate tribal jurisdiction. It
is not yet clear whether a new day is dawning for tribes in the Supreme
Court, especially because McGirt is a 5–4 decision and one of the
members of the majority has passed away. However, there is cause for
at least modest hope that change is afoot. Moreover, if McGirt is any
indication, there is a substantial possibility that the Court may realign
itself with the canons of construction in federal Indian law, as fleshed
out by Cohen, and return to a principled approach rooted in core
doctrine, rather than the pell-mell methodologies we have too often
seen in recent decades.

253. For example, Justice Barrett framed her answers in a way that recognized that she had not yet been
confirmed and may not be, Barrett Confirmation Hearing, supra note 197, a contrast to Justice
Kavanaugh’s politicized and vitriolic approach at his own confirmation hearings. See, e.g., Brian Naylor,
Brett Kavanaugh Offers Fiery Defense in Hearing That Was a National Cultural Moment, NPR (Sept. 28,
2018, 12:13 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/28/652239571/brett-kavanaugh-offers-fiery-defense-inhearing-that-was-a-national-cultural-mom [https://perma.cc/7R46-BAK4].
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